NetBSD/sys/dev/pcmcia/if_xivar.h

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/* $NetBSD: if_xivar.h,v 1.9 2015/04/13 16:33:25 riastradh Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Charles M. Hannum. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by Charles M. Hannum.
* 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*/
#include <sys/rndsource.h>
struct xi_softc {
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device_t sc_dev; /* Generic device info */
struct ethercom sc_ethercom; /* Ethernet common part */
struct mii_data sc_mii; /* MII media information */
bus_space_tag_t sc_bst; /* Bus cookie */
bus_space_handle_t sc_bsh; /* Bus I/O handle */
/* Power management hooks and state. */
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int (*sc_enable)(struct xi_softc *);
void (*sc_disable)(struct xi_softc *);
int sc_enabled;
int sc_chipset; /* Chipset type */
#define XI_CHIPSET_SCIPPER 0
#define XI_CHIPSET_MOHAWK 1
#define XI_CHIPSET_DINGO 2
u_int8_t sc_rev; /* Chip revision */
First step of random number subsystem rework described in <20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
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krndsource_t sc_rnd_source;
};
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void xi_attach(struct xi_softc *, u_int8_t *);
int xi_detach(device_t, int);
int xi_activate(device_t, enum devact);
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int xi_intr(void *);