2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
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/* $NetBSD: kern_entropy.c,v 1.45 2022/03/20 13:17:44 riastradh Exp $ */
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Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2019 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
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* by Taylor R. Campbell.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
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* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
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* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
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* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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* Entropy subsystem
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*
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* * Each CPU maintains a per-CPU entropy pool so that gathering
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* entropy requires no interprocessor synchronization, except
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* early at boot when we may be scrambling to gather entropy as
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* soon as possible.
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*
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* - entropy_enter gathers entropy and never drops it on the
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* floor, at the cost of sometimes having to do cryptography.
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*
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* - entropy_enter_intr gathers entropy or drops it on the
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* floor, with low latency. Work to stir the pool or kick the
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* housekeeping thread is scheduled in soft interrupts.
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*
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* * entropy_enter immediately enters into the global pool if it
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* can transition to full entropy in one swell foop. Otherwise,
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* it defers to a housekeeping thread that consolidates entropy,
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* but only when the CPUs collectively have full entropy, in
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* order to mitigate iterative-guessing attacks.
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*
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* * The entropy housekeeping thread continues to consolidate
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* entropy even after we think we have full entropy, in case we
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* are wrong, but is limited to one discretionary consolidation
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* per minute, and only when new entropy is actually coming in,
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* to limit performance impact.
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*
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* * The entropy epoch is the number that changes when we
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* transition from partial entropy to full entropy, so that
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* users can easily determine when to reseed. This also
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* facilitates an operator explicitly causing everything to
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2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
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* reseed by sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
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Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
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*
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* * No entropy estimation based on the sample values, which is a
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* contradiction in terms and a potential source of side
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* channels. It is the responsibility of the driver author to
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* study how predictable the physical source of input can ever
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* be, and to furnish a lower bound on the amount of entropy it
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* has.
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*
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* * Entropy depletion is available for testing (or if you're into
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* that sort of thing), with sysctl -w kern.entropy.depletion=1;
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* the logic to support it is small, to minimize chance of bugs.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
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__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_entropy.c,v 1.45 2022/03/20 13:17:44 riastradh Exp $");
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Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/atomic.h>
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#include <sys/compat_stub.h>
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#include <sys/condvar.h>
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#include <sys/cpu.h>
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#include <sys/entropy.h>
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#include <sys/errno.h>
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#include <sys/evcnt.h>
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#include <sys/event.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
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#include <sys/intr.h>
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#include <sys/kauth.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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#include <sys/kmem.h>
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#include <sys/kthread.h>
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#include <sys/module_hook.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/percpu.h>
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#include <sys/poll.h>
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#include <sys/queue.h>
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2021-02-12 22:48:26 +03:00
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#include <sys/reboot.h>
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Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
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#include <sys/rnd.h> /* legacy kernel API */
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#include <sys/rndio.h> /* userland ioctl interface */
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#include <sys/rndsource.h> /* kernel rndsource driver API */
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#include <sys/select.h>
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#include <sys/selinfo.h>
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#include <sys/sha1.h> /* for boot seed checksum */
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#include <sys/stdint.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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2021-01-11 05:18:40 +03:00
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#include <sys/syslog.h>
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Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/xcall.h>
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#include <lib/libkern/entpool.h>
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#include <machine/limits.h>
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#ifdef __HAVE_CPU_COUNTER
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#include <machine/cpu_counter.h>
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#endif
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/*
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* struct entropy_cpu
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*
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* Per-CPU entropy state. The pool is allocated separately
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* because percpu(9) sometimes moves per-CPU objects around
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* without zeroing them, which would lead to unwanted copies of
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2022-03-05 00:12:03 +03:00
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* sensitive secrets. The evcnt is allocated separately because
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Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
* evcnt(9) assumes it stays put in memory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu {
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_evcnt {
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt softint;
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt intrdrop;
|
|
|
|
struct evcnt intrtrunc;
|
|
|
|
} *ec_evcnt;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entpool *ec_pool;
|
|
|
|
unsigned ec_pending;
|
|
|
|
bool ec_locked;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* struct entropy_cpu_lock
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* State for locking the per-CPU entropy state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_lock {
|
|
|
|
int ecl_s;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t ecl_ncsw;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* struct rndsource_cpu
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Per-CPU rndsource state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct rndsource_cpu {
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned rc_entropybits;
|
|
|
|
unsigned rc_timesamples;
|
|
|
|
unsigned rc_datasamples;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_global (a.k.a. E for short in this file)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Global entropy state. Writes protected by the global lock.
|
|
|
|
* Some fields, marked (A), can be read outside the lock, and are
|
|
|
|
* maintained with atomic_load/store_relaxed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
kmutex_t lock; /* covers all global state */
|
|
|
|
struct entpool pool; /* global pool for extraction */
|
|
|
|
unsigned needed; /* (A) needed globally */
|
|
|
|
unsigned pending; /* (A) pending in per-CPU pools */
|
|
|
|
unsigned timestamp; /* (A) time of last consolidation */
|
|
|
|
unsigned epoch; /* (A) changes when needed -> 0 */
|
|
|
|
kcondvar_t cv; /* notifies state changes */
|
|
|
|
struct selinfo selq; /* notifies needed -> 0 */
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
struct lwp *sourcelock; /* lock on list of sources */
|
2021-01-14 02:53:23 +03:00
|
|
|
kcondvar_t sourcelock_cv; /* notifies sourcelock release */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_HEAD(,krndsource) sources; /* list of entropy sources */
|
|
|
|
enum entropy_stage {
|
|
|
|
ENTROPY_COLD = 0, /* single-threaded */
|
|
|
|
ENTROPY_WARM, /* multi-threaded at boot before CPUs */
|
|
|
|
ENTROPY_HOT, /* multi-threaded multi-CPU */
|
|
|
|
} stage;
|
|
|
|
bool consolidate; /* kick thread to consolidate */
|
|
|
|
bool seed_rndsource; /* true if seed source is attached */
|
|
|
|
bool seeded; /* true if seed file already loaded */
|
|
|
|
} entropy_global __cacheline_aligned = {
|
|
|
|
/* Fields that must be initialized when the kernel is loaded. */
|
|
|
|
.needed = ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY,
|
2020-05-07 22:07:29 +03:00
|
|
|
.epoch = (unsigned)-1, /* -1 means entropy never consolidated */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
.sources = LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(entropy_global.sources),
|
|
|
|
.stage = ENTROPY_COLD,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define E (&entropy_global) /* declutter */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read-mostly globals */
|
|
|
|
static struct percpu *entropy_percpu __read_mostly; /* struct entropy_cpu */
|
|
|
|
static void *entropy_sih __read_mostly; /* softint handler */
|
|
|
|
static struct lwp *entropy_lwp __read_mostly; /* housekeeping thread */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct krndsource seed_rndsource __read_mostly;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Event counters
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Must be careful with adding these because they can serve as
|
|
|
|
* side channels.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_discretionary_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "discretionary");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_discretionary_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_immediate_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "immediate");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_immediate_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_partial_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "partial");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_partial_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_consolidate_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "consolidate");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_consolidate_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_extract_fail_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "extract fail");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_extract_fail_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_request_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "request");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_request_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_deplete_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "deplete");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_deplete_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
static struct evcnt entropy_notify_evcnt =
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_INITIALIZER(EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL, "entropy", "notify");
|
|
|
|
EVCNT_ATTACH_STATIC(entropy_notify_evcnt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Sysctl knobs */
|
2020-05-08 18:54:11 +03:00
|
|
|
static bool entropy_collection = 1;
|
|
|
|
static bool entropy_depletion = 0; /* Silly! */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct sysctlnode *entropy_sysctlroot;
|
|
|
|
static struct sysctllog *entropy_sysctllog;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Forward declarations */
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_init_cpu(void *, void *, struct cpu_info *);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_fini_cpu(void *, void *, struct cpu_info *);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_account_cpu(struct entropy_cpu *);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_enter(const void *, size_t, unsigned);
|
|
|
|
static bool entropy_enter_intr(const void *, size_t, unsigned);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_softintr(void *);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_thread(void *);
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t entropy_pending(void);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_pending_cpu(void *, void *, struct cpu_info *);
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
static void entropy_do_consolidate(void);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_consolidate_xc(void *, void *);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
static void entropy_notify(void);
|
|
|
|
static int sysctl_entropy_consolidate(SYSCTLFN_ARGS);
|
2020-05-05 18:31:42 +03:00
|
|
|
static int sysctl_entropy_gather(SYSCTLFN_ARGS);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
static void filt_entropy_read_detach(struct knote *);
|
|
|
|
static int filt_entropy_read_event(struct knote *, long);
|
|
|
|
static void entropy_request(size_t);
|
|
|
|
static void rnd_add_data_1(struct krndsource *, const void *, uint32_t,
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
uint32_t, uint32_t);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
static unsigned rndsource_entropybits(struct krndsource *);
|
|
|
|
static void rndsource_entropybits_cpu(void *, void *, struct cpu_info *);
|
|
|
|
static void rndsource_to_user(struct krndsource *, rndsource_t *);
|
|
|
|
static void rndsource_to_user_est(struct krndsource *, rndsource_est_t *);
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
static void rndsource_to_user_est_cpu(void *, void *, struct cpu_info *);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_timer()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Cycle counter, time counter, or anything that changes a wee bit
|
|
|
|
* unpredictably.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline uint32_t
|
|
|
|
entropy_timer(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct bintime bt;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t v;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we have a CPU cycle counter, use the low 32 bits. */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __HAVE_CPU_COUNTER
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_true(cpu_hascounter()))
|
|
|
|
return cpu_counter32();
|
|
|
|
#endif /* __HAVE_CPU_COUNTER */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we're cold, tough. Can't binuptime while cold. */
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(cold))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fold the 128 bits of binuptime into 32 bits. */
|
|
|
|
binuptime(&bt);
|
|
|
|
v = bt.frac;
|
|
|
|
v ^= bt.frac >> 32;
|
|
|
|
v ^= bt.sec;
|
|
|
|
v ^= bt.sec >> 32;
|
|
|
|
return v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
attach_seed_rndsource(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First called no later than entropy_init, while we are still
|
|
|
|
* single-threaded, so no need for RUN_ONCE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM || E->seed_rndsource)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
rnd_attach_source(&seed_rndsource, "seed", RND_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
|
|
|
|
RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE);
|
|
|
|
E->seed_rndsource = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_init()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Initialize the entropy subsystem. Panic on failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Requires percpu(9) and sysctl(9) to be initialized.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t extra[2];
|
|
|
|
struct krndsource *rs;
|
|
|
|
unsigned i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Grab some cycle counts early at boot. */
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Run the entropy pool cryptography self-test. */
|
|
|
|
if (entpool_selftest() == -1)
|
|
|
|
panic("entropy pool crypto self-test failed");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create the sysctl directory. */
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, NULL, &entropy_sysctlroot,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT, CTLTYPE_NODE, "entropy",
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Entropy (random number sources) options"),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
|
|
CTL_KERN, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create the sysctl knobs. */
|
|
|
|
/* XXX These shouldn't be writable at securelevel>0. */
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE, CTLTYPE_BOOL, "collection",
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Automatically collect entropy from hardware"),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, &entropy_collection, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE, CTLTYPE_BOOL, "depletion",
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("`Deplete' entropy pool when observed"),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, &entropy_depletion, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE, CTLTYPE_INT, "consolidate",
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Trigger entropy consolidation now"),
|
|
|
|
sysctl_entropy_consolidate, 0, NULL, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
2020-05-05 18:31:42 +03:00
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE, CTLTYPE_INT, "gather",
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Trigger entropy gathering from sources now"),
|
|
|
|
sysctl_entropy_gather, 0, NULL, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* XXX These should maybe not be readable at securelevel>0. */
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READONLY|CTLFLAG_PRIVATE, CTLTYPE_INT,
|
|
|
|
"needed", SYSCTL_DESCR("Systemwide entropy deficit"),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, &E->needed, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READONLY|CTLFLAG_PRIVATE, CTLTYPE_INT,
|
|
|
|
"pending", SYSCTL_DESCR("Entropy pending on CPUs"),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, &E->pending, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(&entropy_sysctllog, 0, &entropy_sysctlroot, NULL,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READONLY|CTLFLAG_PRIVATE, CTLTYPE_INT,
|
|
|
|
"epoch", SYSCTL_DESCR("Entropy epoch"),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, &E->epoch, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the global state for multithreaded operation. */
|
2022-03-19 02:35:19 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_init(&E->lock, MUTEX_DEFAULT, IPL_SOFTSERIAL);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
cv_init(&E->cv, "entropy");
|
|
|
|
selinit(&E->selq);
|
2021-01-14 02:53:23 +03:00
|
|
|
cv_init(&E->sourcelock_cv, "entsrclock");
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the seed source is attached. */
|
|
|
|
attach_seed_rndsource();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Note if the bootloader didn't provide a seed. */
|
|
|
|
if (!E->seeded)
|
2021-01-21 20:33:55 +03:00
|
|
|
aprint_debug("entropy: no seed from bootloader\n");
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate the per-CPU records for all early entropy sources. */
|
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list)
|
|
|
|
rs->state = percpu_alloc(sizeof(struct rndsource_cpu));
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:34:44 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Allocate and initialize the per-CPU state. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_percpu = percpu_create(sizeof(struct entropy_cpu),
|
|
|
|
entropy_init_cpu, entropy_fini_cpu, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Enter the boot cycle count to get started. */
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(i == __arraycount(extra));
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter(extra, sizeof extra, 0);
|
|
|
|
explicit_memset(extra, 0, sizeof extra);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We are now ready for multi-threaded operation. */
|
|
|
|
E->stage = ENTROPY_WARM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_init_late_cpu(void *a, void *b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entropy_softintr(NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_init_late()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Late initialization. Panic on failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Requires CPUs to have been detected and LWPs to have started.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_init_late(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
void *sih;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Establish the softint at the highest softint priority level.
|
|
|
|
* Must happen after CPU detection.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
sih = softint_establish(SOFTINT_SERIAL|SOFTINT_MPSAFE,
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
&entropy_softintr, NULL);
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
if (sih == NULL)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
panic("unable to establish entropy softint");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create the entropy housekeeping thread. Must happen after
|
|
|
|
* lwpinit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
error = kthread_create(PRI_NONE, KTHREAD_MPSAFE|KTHREAD_TS, NULL,
|
|
|
|
entropy_thread, NULL, &entropy_lwp, "entbutler");
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
panic("unable to create entropy housekeeping thread: %d",
|
|
|
|
error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Wait until the per-CPU initialization has hit all CPUs
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
* before proceeding to mark the entropy system hot and
|
|
|
|
* enabling use of the softint.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
xc_barrier(XC_HIGHPRI);
|
|
|
|
E->stage = ENTROPY_HOT;
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&entropy_sih, sih);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* At this point, entering new samples from interrupt handlers
|
|
|
|
* will trigger the softint to process them. But there may be
|
|
|
|
* some samples that were entered from interrupt handlers
|
|
|
|
* before the softint was available. Make sure we process
|
|
|
|
* those samples on all CPUs by running the softint logic on
|
|
|
|
* all CPUs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
xc_wait(xc_broadcast(XC_HIGHPRI, entropy_init_late_cpu, NULL, NULL));
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_init_cpu(ptr, cookie, ci)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* percpu(9) constructor for per-CPU entropy pool.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_init_cpu(void *ptr, void *cookie, struct cpu_info *ci)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec = ptr;
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
const char *cpuname;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
ec->ec_evcnt = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*ec->ec_evcnt), KM_SLEEP);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
ec->ec_pool = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*ec->ec_pool), KM_SLEEP);
|
|
|
|
ec->ec_pending = 0;
|
|
|
|
ec->ec_locked = false;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:34:44 +03:00
|
|
|
/* XXX ci_cpuname may not be initialized early enough. */
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
cpuname = ci->ci_cpuname[0] == '\0' ? "cpu0" : ci->ci_cpuname;
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_dynamic(&ec->ec_evcnt->softint, EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL,
|
|
|
|
cpuname, "entropy softint");
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_dynamic(&ec->ec_evcnt->intrdrop, EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL,
|
|
|
|
cpuname, "entropy intrdrop");
|
|
|
|
evcnt_attach_dynamic(&ec->ec_evcnt->intrtrunc, EVCNT_TYPE_MISC, NULL,
|
|
|
|
cpuname, "entropy intrtrunc");
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_fini_cpu(ptr, cookie, ci)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* percpu(9) destructor for per-CPU entropy pool.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_fini_cpu(void *ptr, void *cookie, struct cpu_info *ci)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Zero any lingering data. Disclosure of the per-CPU pool
|
|
|
|
* shouldn't retroactively affect the security of any keys
|
|
|
|
* generated, because entpool(9) erases whatever we have just
|
|
|
|
* drawn out of any pool, but better safe than sorry.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
explicit_memset(ec->ec_pool, 0, sizeof(*ec->ec_pool));
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
evcnt_detach(&ec->ec_evcnt->intrtrunc);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_detach(&ec->ec_evcnt->intrdrop);
|
|
|
|
evcnt_detach(&ec->ec_evcnt->softint);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kmem_free(ec->ec_pool, sizeof(*ec->ec_pool));
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
kmem_free(ec->ec_evcnt, sizeof(*ec->ec_evcnt));
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* ec = entropy_cpu_get(&lock)
|
|
|
|
* entropy_cpu_put(&lock, ec)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Lock and unlock the per-CPU entropy state. This only prevents
|
|
|
|
* access on the same CPU -- by hard interrupts, by soft
|
|
|
|
* interrupts, or by other threads.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Blocks soft interrupts and preemption altogether; doesn't block
|
|
|
|
* hard interrupts, but causes samples in hard interrupts to be
|
|
|
|
* dropped.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct entropy_cpu *
|
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_get(struct entropy_cpu_lock *lock)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ec = percpu_getref(entropy_percpu);
|
|
|
|
lock->ecl_s = splsoftserial();
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(!ec->ec_locked);
|
|
|
|
ec->ec_locked = true;
|
|
|
|
lock->ecl_ncsw = curlwp->l_ncsw;
|
|
|
|
__insn_barrier();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ec;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_put(struct entropy_cpu_lock *lock, struct entropy_cpu *ec)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(ec == percpu_getptr_remote(entropy_percpu, curcpu()));
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(ec->ec_locked);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
__insn_barrier();
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(lock->ecl_ncsw == curlwp->l_ncsw);
|
|
|
|
ec->ec_locked = false;
|
|
|
|
splx(lock->ecl_s);
|
|
|
|
percpu_putref(entropy_percpu);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_seed(seed)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Seed the entropy pool with seed. Meant to be called as early
|
|
|
|
* as possible by the bootloader; may be called before or after
|
|
|
|
* entropy_init. Must be called before system reaches userland.
|
|
|
|
* Must be called in thread or soft interrupt context, not in hard
|
|
|
|
* interrupt context. Must be called at most once.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Overwrites the seed in place. Caller may then free the memory.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_seed(rndsave_t *seed)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SHA1_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
bool seeded;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Verify the checksum. If the checksum fails, take the data
|
|
|
|
* but ignore the entropy estimate -- the file may have been
|
|
|
|
* incompletely written with garbage, which is harmless to add
|
|
|
|
* but may not be as unpredictable as alleged.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
SHA1Init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
SHA1Update(&ctx, (const void *)&seed->entropy, sizeof(seed->entropy));
|
|
|
|
SHA1Update(&ctx, seed->data, sizeof(seed->data));
|
|
|
|
SHA1Final(digest, &ctx);
|
|
|
|
CTASSERT(sizeof(seed->digest) == sizeof(digest));
|
|
|
|
if (!consttime_memequal(digest, seed->digest, sizeof(digest))) {
|
|
|
|
printf("entropy: invalid seed checksum\n");
|
|
|
|
seed->entropy = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-30 06:42:23 +03:00
|
|
|
explicit_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
explicit_memset(digest, 0, sizeof digest);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-30 06:42:23 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the entropy is insensibly large, try byte-swapping.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise assume the file is corrupted and act as though it
|
|
|
|
* has zero entropy.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (howmany(seed->entropy, NBBY) > sizeof(seed->data)) {
|
|
|
|
seed->entropy = bswap32(seed->entropy);
|
|
|
|
if (howmany(seed->entropy, NBBY) > sizeof(seed->data))
|
|
|
|
seed->entropy = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Make sure the seed source is attached. */
|
|
|
|
attach_seed_rndsource();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Test and set E->seeded. */
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
seeded = E->seeded;
|
2020-05-06 21:31:05 +03:00
|
|
|
E->seeded = (seed->entropy > 0);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we've been seeded, may be re-entering the same seed
|
|
|
|
* (e.g., bootloader vs module init, or something). No harm in
|
|
|
|
* entering it twice, but it contributes no additional entropy.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (seeded) {
|
|
|
|
printf("entropy: double-seeded by bootloader\n");
|
|
|
|
seed->entropy = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2020-05-06 21:31:05 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("entropy: entering seed from bootloader"
|
|
|
|
" with %u bits of entropy\n", (unsigned)seed->entropy);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Enter it into the pool and promptly zero it. */
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(&seed_rndsource, seed->data, sizeof(seed->data),
|
|
|
|
seed->entropy);
|
|
|
|
explicit_memset(seed, 0, sizeof(*seed));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_bootrequest()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Request entropy from all sources at boot, once config is
|
|
|
|
* complete and interrupts are running.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
entropy_bootrequest(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Request enough to satisfy the maximum entropy shortage.
|
|
|
|
* This is harmless overkill if the bootloader provided a seed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
entropy_request(ENTROPY_CAPACITY);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_epoch()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the current entropy epoch. If this changes, you should
|
2020-05-07 22:07:29 +03:00
|
|
|
* reseed. If -1, means system entropy has not yet reached full
|
|
|
|
* entropy or been explicitly consolidated; never reverts back to
|
|
|
|
* -1. Never zero, so you can always use zero as an uninitialized
|
|
|
|
* sentinel value meaning `reseed ASAP'.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Usage model:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct foo {
|
|
|
|
* struct crypto_prng prng;
|
|
|
|
* unsigned epoch;
|
|
|
|
* } *foo;
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* unsigned epoch = entropy_epoch();
|
|
|
|
* if (__predict_false(epoch != foo->epoch)) {
|
|
|
|
* uint8_t seed[32];
|
|
|
|
* if (entropy_extract(seed, sizeof seed, 0) != 0)
|
|
|
|
* warn("no entropy");
|
|
|
|
* crypto_prng_reseed(&foo->prng, seed, sizeof seed);
|
|
|
|
* foo->epoch = epoch;
|
|
|
|
* }
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
unsigned
|
|
|
|
entropy_epoch(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unsigned int, so no need for seqlock for an atomic read, but
|
|
|
|
* make sure we read it afresh each time.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return atomic_load_relaxed(&E->epoch);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
New system call getrandom() compatible with Linux and others.
Three ways to call:
getrandom(p, n, 0) Blocks at boot until full entropy.
Returns up to n bytes at p; guarantees
up to 256 bytes even if interrupted
after blocking. getrandom(0,0,0)
serves as an entropy barrier: return
only after system has full entropy.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_INSECURE) Never blocks. Guarantees up to 256
bytes even if interrupted. Equivalent
to /dev/urandom. Safe only after
successful getrandom(...,0),
getrandom(...,GRND_RANDOM), or read
from /dev/random.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_RANDOM) May block at any time. Returns up to n
bytes at p, but no guarantees about how
many -- may return as short as 1 byte.
Equivalent to /dev/random. Legacy.
Provided only for source compatibility
with Linux.
Can also use flags|GRND_NONBLOCK to fail with EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN
without producing any output instead of blocking.
- The combination GRND_INSECURE|GRND_NONBLOCK is the same as
GRND_INSECURE, since GRND_INSECURE never blocks anyway.
- The combinations GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM and
GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_NONBLOCK are nonsensical and fail
with EINVAL.
As proposed on tech-userlevel, tech-crypto, tech-security, and
tech-kern, and subsequently adopted by core (minus the getentropy part
of the proposal, because other operating systems and participants in
the discussion couldn't come to an agreement about getentropy and
blocking semantics):
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2020/05/02/msg012333.html
2020-08-14 03:53:15 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_ready()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* True if the entropy pool has full entropy.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
entropy_ready(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return atomic_load_relaxed(&E->needed) == 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_account_cpu(ec)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Consider whether to consolidate entropy into the global pool
|
|
|
|
* after we just added some into the current CPU's pending pool.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - If this CPU can provide enough entropy now, do so.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - If this and whatever else is available on other CPUs can
|
|
|
|
* provide enough entropy, kick the consolidation thread.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - Otherwise, do as little as possible, except maybe consolidate
|
|
|
|
* entropy at most once a minute.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must be bound to a CPU and therefore have exclusive
|
|
|
|
* access to ec. Will acquire and release the global lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_account_cpu(struct entropy_cpu *ec)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-03-20 16:17:32 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_lock lock;
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec0;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned diff;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there's no entropy needed, and entropy has been
|
|
|
|
* consolidated in the last minute, do nothing.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_true(atomic_load_relaxed(&E->needed) == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
__predict_true(!atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_depletion)) &&
|
|
|
|
__predict_true((time_uptime - E->timestamp) <= 60))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-20 16:17:32 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Consider consolidation, under the global lock and with the
|
|
|
|
* per-CPU state locked.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2022-03-20 16:17:32 +03:00
|
|
|
ec0 = entropy_cpu_get(&lock);
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(ec0 == ec);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
if (E->needed != 0 && E->needed <= ec->ec_pending) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we have not yet attained full entropy but we can
|
|
|
|
* now, do so. This way we disseminate entropy
|
|
|
|
* promptly when it becomes available early at boot;
|
|
|
|
* otherwise we leave it to the entropy consolidation
|
|
|
|
* thread, which is rate-limited to mitigate side
|
|
|
|
* channels and abuse.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[ENTPOOL_CAPACITY];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Transfer from the local pool to the global pool. */
|
|
|
|
entpool_extract(ec->ec_pool, buf, sizeof buf);
|
|
|
|
entpool_enter(&E->pool, buf, sizeof buf);
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&ec->ec_pending, 0);
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&E->needed, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Notify waiters that we now have full entropy. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_notify();
|
|
|
|
entropy_immediate_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
2020-05-09 09:12:32 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Determine how much we can add to the global pool. */
|
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(E->pending <= ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY,
|
|
|
|
"E->pending=%u", E->pending);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
diff = MIN(ec->ec_pending, ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - E->pending);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
|
|
|
* This should make a difference unless we are already
|
|
|
|
* saturated.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(diff || E->pending == ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY,
|
|
|
|
"diff=%u E->pending=%u ec->ec_pending=%u cap=%u",
|
|
|
|
diff, E->pending, ec->ec_pending,
|
|
|
|
(unsigned)ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add to the global, subtract from the local. */
|
|
|
|
E->pending += diff;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->pending);
|
2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(E->pending <= ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY,
|
|
|
|
"E->pending=%u", E->pending);
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&ec->ec_pending, ec->ec_pending - diff);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (E->needed <= E->pending) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Enough entropy between all the per-CPU
|
|
|
|
* pools. Wake up the housekeeping thread.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If we don't need any entropy, this doesn't
|
|
|
|
* mean much, but it is the only time we ever
|
|
|
|
* gather additional entropy in case the
|
|
|
|
* accounting has been overly optimistic. This
|
|
|
|
* happens at most once a minute, so there's
|
|
|
|
* negligible performance cost.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
E->consolidate = true;
|
|
|
|
cv_broadcast(&E->cv);
|
|
|
|
if (E->needed == 0)
|
|
|
|
entropy_discretionary_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Can't get full entropy. Keep gathering. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_partial_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-03-20 16:17:32 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_put(&lock, ec);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_enter_early(buf, len, nbits)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Do entropy bookkeeping globally, before we have established
|
|
|
|
* per-CPU pools. Enter directly into the global pool in the hope
|
|
|
|
* that we enter enough before the first entropy_extract to thwart
|
|
|
|
* iterative-guessing attacks; entropy_extract will warn if not.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter_early(const void *buf, size_t len, unsigned nbits)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool notify = false;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Enter it into the pool. */
|
|
|
|
entpool_enter(&E->pool, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Decide whether to notify reseed -- we will do so if either:
|
|
|
|
* (a) we transition from partial entropy to full entropy, or
|
|
|
|
* (b) we get a batch of full entropy all at once.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
notify |= (E->needed && E->needed <= nbits);
|
|
|
|
notify |= (nbits >= ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Subtract from the needed count and notify if appropriate. */
|
|
|
|
E->needed -= MIN(E->needed, nbits);
|
|
|
|
if (notify) {
|
|
|
|
entropy_notify();
|
|
|
|
entropy_immediate_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_enter(buf, len, nbits)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Enter len bytes of data from buf into the system's entropy
|
|
|
|
* pool, stirring as necessary when the internal buffer fills up.
|
|
|
|
* nbits is a lower bound on the number of bits of entropy in the
|
|
|
|
* process that led to this sample.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter(const void *buf, size_t len, unsigned nbits)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_lock lock;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec;
|
entropy(9): Avoid reentrance to per-CPU state from sleeping on lock.
Changing the global entropy lock from IPL_VM to IPL_SOFTSERIAL meant
it went from being a spin lock, which blocks preemption, to being an
adaptive lock, which might sleep -- and allow other threads to run
concurrently with the softint, even if those threads have softints
blocked with splsoftserial.
This manifested as KASSERT(!ec->ec_locked) triggering in
entropy_consolidate_xc -- presumably entropy_softintr slept on the
global entropy lock while holding the per-CPU state locked with
ec->ec_locked, and then entropy_consolidate_xc ran.
Instead, to protect access to the per-CPU state without taking a
global lock, defer entropy_account_cpu until after ec->ec_locked is
cleared. This way, we never sleep while holding ec->ec_locked, nor
do we incur any contention on shared memory when entering entropy
unless we're about to distribute it. To verify this, sprinkle in
assertions that curlwp->l_ncsw hasn't changed by the time we release
ec->ec_locked.
2022-03-20 03:19:11 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned pending;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-08 03:54:44 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(!cpu_intr_p(),
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
"use entropy_enter_intr from interrupt context");
|
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(howmany(nbits, NBBY) <= len,
|
|
|
|
"impossible entropy rate: %u bits in %zu-byte string", nbits, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If it's too early after boot, just use entropy_enter_early. */
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD)) {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_enter_early(buf, len, nbits);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
* With the per-CPU state locked, enter into the per-CPU pool
|
|
|
|
* and count up what we can add.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
ec = entropy_cpu_get(&lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
entpool_enter(ec->ec_pool, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
pending = ec->ec_pending;
|
|
|
|
pending += MIN(ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - pending, nbits);
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&ec->ec_pending, pending);
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_put(&lock, ec);
|
entropy(9): Avoid reentrance to per-CPU state from sleeping on lock.
Changing the global entropy lock from IPL_VM to IPL_SOFTSERIAL meant
it went from being a spin lock, which blocks preemption, to being an
adaptive lock, which might sleep -- and allow other threads to run
concurrently with the softint, even if those threads have softints
blocked with splsoftserial.
This manifested as KASSERT(!ec->ec_locked) triggering in
entropy_consolidate_xc -- presumably entropy_softintr slept on the
global entropy lock while holding the per-CPU state locked with
ec->ec_locked, and then entropy_consolidate_xc ran.
Instead, to protect access to the per-CPU state without taking a
global lock, defer entropy_account_cpu until after ec->ec_locked is
cleared. This way, we never sleep while holding ec->ec_locked, nor
do we incur any contention on shared memory when entering entropy
unless we're about to distribute it. To verify this, sprinkle in
assertions that curlwp->l_ncsw hasn't changed by the time we release
ec->ec_locked.
2022-03-20 03:19:11 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Consolidate globally if appropriate based on what we added. */
|
|
|
|
if (pending)
|
|
|
|
entropy_account_cpu(ec);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_enter_intr(buf, len, nbits)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Enter up to len bytes of data from buf into the system's
|
|
|
|
* entropy pool without stirring. nbits is a lower bound on the
|
|
|
|
* number of bits of entropy in the process that led to this
|
|
|
|
* sample. If the sample could be entered completely, assume
|
|
|
|
* nbits of entropy pending; otherwise assume none, since we don't
|
|
|
|
* know whether some parts of the sample are constant, for
|
|
|
|
* instance. Schedule a softint to stir the entropy pool if
|
|
|
|
* needed. Return true if used fully, false if truncated at all.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Using this in thread context will work, but you might as well
|
|
|
|
* use entropy_enter in that case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter_intr(const void *buf, size_t len, unsigned nbits)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec;
|
|
|
|
bool fullyused = false;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t pending;
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
void *sih;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-20 16:17:44 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(cpu_intr_p());
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(howmany(nbits, NBBY) <= len,
|
|
|
|
"impossible entropy rate: %u bits in %zu-byte string", nbits, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If it's too early after boot, just use entropy_enter_early. */
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD)) {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_enter_early(buf, len, nbits);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Acquire the per-CPU state. If someone is in the middle of
|
|
|
|
* using it, drop the sample. Otherwise, take the lock so that
|
|
|
|
* higher-priority interrupts will drop their samples.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ec = percpu_getref(entropy_percpu);
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ec->ec_locked) {
|
|
|
|
ec->ec_evcnt->intrdrop.ev_count++;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
goto out0;
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
ec->ec_locked = true;
|
|
|
|
__insn_barrier();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Enter as much as we can into the per-CPU pool. If it was
|
|
|
|
* truncated, schedule a softint to stir the pool and stop.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!entpool_enter_nostir(ec->ec_pool, buf, len)) {
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
sih = atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_sih);
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_true(sih != NULL))
|
|
|
|
softint_schedule(sih);
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
ec->ec_evcnt->intrtrunc.ev_count++;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
goto out1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fullyused = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Count up what we can contribute. */
|
|
|
|
pending = ec->ec_pending;
|
|
|
|
pending += MIN(ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - pending, nbits);
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&ec->ec_pending, pending);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Schedule a softint if we added anything and it matters. */
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_false((atomic_load_relaxed(&E->needed) != 0) ||
|
|
|
|
atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_depletion)) &&
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
nbits != 0) {
|
|
|
|
sih = atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_sih);
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_true(sih != NULL))
|
|
|
|
softint_schedule(sih);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out1: /* Release the per-CPU state. */
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(ec->ec_locked);
|
|
|
|
__insn_barrier();
|
|
|
|
ec->ec_locked = false;
|
|
|
|
out0: percpu_putref(entropy_percpu);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fullyused;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_softintr(cookie)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Soft interrupt handler for entering entropy. Takes care of
|
|
|
|
* stirring the local CPU's entropy pool if it filled up during
|
|
|
|
* hard interrupts, and promptly crediting entropy from the local
|
|
|
|
* CPU's entropy pool to the global entropy pool if needed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_softintr(void *cookie)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_lock lock;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec;
|
entropy(9): Avoid reentrance to per-CPU state from sleeping on lock.
Changing the global entropy lock from IPL_VM to IPL_SOFTSERIAL meant
it went from being a spin lock, which blocks preemption, to being an
adaptive lock, which might sleep -- and allow other threads to run
concurrently with the softint, even if those threads have softints
blocked with splsoftserial.
This manifested as KASSERT(!ec->ec_locked) triggering in
entropy_consolidate_xc -- presumably entropy_softintr slept on the
global entropy lock while holding the per-CPU state locked with
ec->ec_locked, and then entropy_consolidate_xc ran.
Instead, to protect access to the per-CPU state without taking a
global lock, defer entropy_account_cpu until after ec->ec_locked is
cleared. This way, we never sleep while holding ec->ec_locked, nor
do we incur any contention on shared memory when entering entropy
unless we're about to distribute it. To verify this, sprinkle in
assertions that curlwp->l_ncsw hasn't changed by the time we release
ec->ec_locked.
2022-03-20 03:19:11 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned pending;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
* With the per-CPU state locked, stir the pool if necessary
|
|
|
|
* and determine if there's any pending entropy on this CPU to
|
|
|
|
* account globally.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
ec = entropy_cpu_get(&lock);
|
2022-03-19 02:35:28 +03:00
|
|
|
ec->ec_evcnt->softint.ev_count++;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
entpool_stir(ec->ec_pool);
|
entropy(9): Avoid reentrance to per-CPU state from sleeping on lock.
Changing the global entropy lock from IPL_VM to IPL_SOFTSERIAL meant
it went from being a spin lock, which blocks preemption, to being an
adaptive lock, which might sleep -- and allow other threads to run
concurrently with the softint, even if those threads have softints
blocked with splsoftserial.
This manifested as KASSERT(!ec->ec_locked) triggering in
entropy_consolidate_xc -- presumably entropy_softintr slept on the
global entropy lock while holding the per-CPU state locked with
ec->ec_locked, and then entropy_consolidate_xc ran.
Instead, to protect access to the per-CPU state without taking a
global lock, defer entropy_account_cpu until after ec->ec_locked is
cleared. This way, we never sleep while holding ec->ec_locked, nor
do we incur any contention on shared memory when entering entropy
unless we're about to distribute it. To verify this, sprinkle in
assertions that curlwp->l_ncsw hasn't changed by the time we release
ec->ec_locked.
2022-03-20 03:19:11 +03:00
|
|
|
pending = ec->ec_pending;
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_put(&lock, ec);
|
entropy(9): Avoid reentrance to per-CPU state from sleeping on lock.
Changing the global entropy lock from IPL_VM to IPL_SOFTSERIAL meant
it went from being a spin lock, which blocks preemption, to being an
adaptive lock, which might sleep -- and allow other threads to run
concurrently with the softint, even if those threads have softints
blocked with splsoftserial.
This manifested as KASSERT(!ec->ec_locked) triggering in
entropy_consolidate_xc -- presumably entropy_softintr slept on the
global entropy lock while holding the per-CPU state locked with
ec->ec_locked, and then entropy_consolidate_xc ran.
Instead, to protect access to the per-CPU state without taking a
global lock, defer entropy_account_cpu until after ec->ec_locked is
cleared. This way, we never sleep while holding ec->ec_locked, nor
do we incur any contention on shared memory when entering entropy
unless we're about to distribute it. To verify this, sprinkle in
assertions that curlwp->l_ncsw hasn't changed by the time we release
ec->ec_locked.
2022-03-20 03:19:11 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Consolidate globally if appropriate based on what we added. */
|
|
|
|
if (pending)
|
|
|
|
entropy_account_cpu(ec);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_thread(cookie)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Handle any asynchronous entropy housekeeping.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_thread(void *cookie)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-30 19:43:12 +03:00
|
|
|
bool consolidate;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-04-30 19:43:12 +03:00
|
|
|
* Wait until there's full entropy somewhere among the
|
|
|
|
* CPUs, as confirmed at most once per minute, or
|
|
|
|
* someone wants to consolidate.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-30 19:43:12 +03:00
|
|
|
if (entropy_pending() >= ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY) {
|
|
|
|
consolidate = true;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!E->consolidate)
|
|
|
|
cv_timedwait(&E->cv, &E->lock, 60*hz);
|
|
|
|
consolidate = E->consolidate;
|
|
|
|
E->consolidate = false;
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-30 19:43:12 +03:00
|
|
|
if (consolidate) {
|
|
|
|
/* Do it. */
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_do_consolidate();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2020-04-30 19:43:12 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Mitigate abuse. */
|
|
|
|
kpause("entropy", false, hz, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_pending()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Count up the amount of entropy pending on other CPUs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t
|
|
|
|
entropy_pending(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t pending = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
percpu_foreach(entropy_percpu, &entropy_pending_cpu, &pending);
|
|
|
|
return pending;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_pending_cpu(void *ptr, void *cookie, struct cpu_info *ci)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec = ptr;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t *pendingp = cookie;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t cpu_pending;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cpu_pending = atomic_load_relaxed(&ec->ec_pending);
|
|
|
|
*pendingp += MIN(ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - *pendingp, cpu_pending);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
* entropy_do_consolidate()
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Issue a cross-call to gather entropy on all CPUs and advance
|
|
|
|
* the entropy epoch.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_do_consolidate(void)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const struct timeval interval = {.tv_sec = 60, .tv_usec = 0};
|
|
|
|
static struct timeval lasttime; /* serialized by E->lock */
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entpool pool;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[ENTPOOL_CAPACITY];
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned diff;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t ticket;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Gather entropy on all CPUs into a temporary pool. */
|
|
|
|
memset(&pool, 0, sizeof pool);
|
|
|
|
ticket = xc_broadcast(0, &entropy_consolidate_xc, &pool, NULL);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
xc_wait(ticket);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Acquire the lock to notify waiters. */
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Count another consolidation. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_consolidate_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Note when we last consolidated, i.e. now. */
|
|
|
|
E->timestamp = time_uptime;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Mix what we gathered into the global pool. */
|
|
|
|
entpool_extract(&pool, buf, sizeof buf);
|
|
|
|
entpool_enter(&E->pool, buf, sizeof buf);
|
|
|
|
explicit_memset(&pool, 0, sizeof pool);
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Count the entropy that was gathered. */
|
|
|
|
diff = MIN(E->needed, E->pending);
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&E->needed, E->needed - diff);
|
|
|
|
E->pending -= diff;
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(E->needed > 0)) {
|
2021-02-12 22:48:26 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ratecheck(&lasttime, &interval) &&
|
|
|
|
(boothowto & AB_DEBUG) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
printf("entropy: WARNING:"
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
" consolidating less than full entropy\n");
|
2021-02-12 22:48:26 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Advance the epoch and notify waiters. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_notify();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Release the lock. */
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-05-10 04:29:40 +03:00
|
|
|
* entropy_consolidate_xc(vpool, arg2)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Extract output from the local CPU's input pool and enter it
|
2020-05-10 04:29:40 +03:00
|
|
|
* into a temporary pool passed as vpool.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_consolidate_xc(void *vpool, void *arg2 __unused)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entpool *pool = vpool;
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_lock lock;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[ENTPOOL_CAPACITY];
|
|
|
|
uint32_t extra[7];
|
|
|
|
unsigned i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Grab CPU number and cycle counter to mix extra into the pool. */
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = cpu_number();
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
* With the per-CPU state locked, extract from the per-CPU pool
|
|
|
|
* and count it as no longer pending.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
ec = entropy_cpu_get(&lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
entpool_extract(ec->ec_pool, buf, sizeof buf);
|
2020-05-07 03:55:13 +03:00
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&ec->ec_pending, 0);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_put(&lock, ec);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copy over statistics, and enter the per-CPU extract and the
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
* extra timing into the temporary pool, under the global lock.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
entpool_enter(pool, buf, sizeof buf);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
explicit_memset(buf, 0, sizeof buf);
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(i == __arraycount(extra));
|
2020-05-10 03:08:12 +03:00
|
|
|
entpool_enter(pool, extra, sizeof extra);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
explicit_memset(extra, 0, sizeof extra);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_notify()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller just contributed entropy to the global pool. Advance
|
|
|
|
* the entropy epoch and notify waiters.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must hold the global entropy lock. Except for the
|
|
|
|
* `sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1` trigger, the caller must
|
|
|
|
* have just have transitioned from partial entropy to full
|
|
|
|
* entropy -- E->needed should be zero now.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_notify(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-05-07 03:55:13 +03:00
|
|
|
static const struct timeval interval = {.tv_sec = 60, .tv_usec = 0};
|
|
|
|
static struct timeval lasttime; /* serialized by E->lock */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned epoch;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD || mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If this is the first time, print a message to the console
|
|
|
|
* that we're ready so operators can compare it to the timing
|
|
|
|
* of other events.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-19 17:35:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(E->epoch == (unsigned)-1) && E->needed == 0)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("entropy: ready\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the epoch; roll over from UINTMAX-1 to 1. */
|
2020-05-07 03:55:13 +03:00
|
|
|
if (__predict_true(!atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_depletion)) ||
|
|
|
|
ratecheck(&lasttime, &interval)) {
|
|
|
|
epoch = E->epoch + 1;
|
|
|
|
if (epoch == 0 || epoch == (unsigned)-1)
|
|
|
|
epoch = 1;
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&E->epoch, epoch);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-03-19 17:35:08 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->epoch != (unsigned)-1);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Notify waiters. */
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM) {
|
|
|
|
cv_broadcast(&E->cv);
|
|
|
|
selnotify(&E->selq, POLLIN|POLLRDNORM, NOTE_SUBMIT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Count another notification. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_notify_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_consolidate()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Trigger entropy consolidation and wait for it to complete.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This should be used sparingly, not periodically -- requiring
|
|
|
|
* conscious intervention by the operator or a clear policy
|
|
|
|
* decision. Otherwise, the kernel will automatically consolidate
|
|
|
|
* when enough entropy has been gathered into per-CPU pools to
|
|
|
|
* transition to full entropy.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
entropy_consolidate(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint64_t ticket;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_HOT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
ticket = entropy_consolidate_evcnt.ev_count;
|
|
|
|
E->consolidate = true;
|
|
|
|
cv_broadcast(&E->cv);
|
|
|
|
while (ticket == entropy_consolidate_evcnt.ev_count) {
|
|
|
|
error = cv_wait_sig(&E->cv, &E->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Trigger entropy consolidation and wait for it to complete.
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
* Writable only by superuser. This, writing to /dev/random, and
|
|
|
|
* ioctl(RNDADDDATA) are the only ways for the system to
|
|
|
|
* consolidate entropy if the operator knows something the kernel
|
|
|
|
* doesn't about how unpredictable the pending entropy pools are.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sysctl_entropy_consolidate(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sysctlnode node = *rnode;
|
|
|
|
int arg;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_HOT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
node.sysctl_data = &arg;
|
|
|
|
error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
|
|
|
|
if (error || newp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
if (arg)
|
|
|
|
entropy_consolidate();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-05 18:31:42 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sysctl -w kern.entropy.gather=1
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Trigger gathering entropy from all on-demand sources, and wait
|
|
|
|
* for synchronous sources (but not asynchronous sources) to
|
|
|
|
* complete. Writable only by superuser.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sysctl_entropy_gather(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sysctlnode node = *rnode;
|
|
|
|
int arg;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_HOT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
node.sysctl_data = &arg;
|
|
|
|
error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
|
|
|
|
if (error || newp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
if (arg) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
entropy_request(ENTROPY_CAPACITY);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_extract(buf, len, flags)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Extract len bytes from the global entropy pool into buf.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Flags may have:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* ENTROPY_WAIT Wait for entropy if not available yet.
|
|
|
|
* ENTROPY_SIG Allow interruption by a signal during wait.
|
New system call getrandom() compatible with Linux and others.
Three ways to call:
getrandom(p, n, 0) Blocks at boot until full entropy.
Returns up to n bytes at p; guarantees
up to 256 bytes even if interrupted
after blocking. getrandom(0,0,0)
serves as an entropy barrier: return
only after system has full entropy.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_INSECURE) Never blocks. Guarantees up to 256
bytes even if interrupted. Equivalent
to /dev/urandom. Safe only after
successful getrandom(...,0),
getrandom(...,GRND_RANDOM), or read
from /dev/random.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_RANDOM) May block at any time. Returns up to n
bytes at p, but no guarantees about how
many -- may return as short as 1 byte.
Equivalent to /dev/random. Legacy.
Provided only for source compatibility
with Linux.
Can also use flags|GRND_NONBLOCK to fail with EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN
without producing any output instead of blocking.
- The combination GRND_INSECURE|GRND_NONBLOCK is the same as
GRND_INSECURE, since GRND_INSECURE never blocks anyway.
- The combinations GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM and
GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_NONBLOCK are nonsensical and fail
with EINVAL.
As proposed on tech-userlevel, tech-crypto, tech-security, and
tech-kern, and subsequently adopted by core (minus the getentropy part
of the proposal, because other operating systems and participants in
the discussion couldn't come to an agreement about getentropy and
blocking semantics):
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2020/05/02/msg012333.html
2020-08-14 03:53:15 +03:00
|
|
|
* ENTROPY_HARDFAIL Either fill the buffer with full entropy,
|
|
|
|
* or fail without filling it at all.
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return zero on success, or error on failure:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* EWOULDBLOCK No entropy and ENTROPY_WAIT not set.
|
|
|
|
* EINTR/ERESTART No entropy, ENTROPY_SIG set, and interrupted.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If ENTROPY_WAIT is set, allowed only in thread context. If
|
|
|
|
* ENTROPY_WAIT is not set, allowed up to IPL_VM. (XXX That's
|
|
|
|
* awfully high... Do we really need it in hard interrupts? This
|
|
|
|
* arises from use of cprng_strong(9).)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
entropy_extract(void *buf, size_t len, int flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const struct timeval interval = {.tv_sec = 60, .tv_usec = 0};
|
|
|
|
static struct timeval lasttime; /* serialized by E->lock */
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, ENTROPY_WAIT)) {
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_SLEEPABLE();
|
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM,
|
|
|
|
"can't wait for entropy until warm");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-17 02:56:55 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Refuse to operate in interrupt context. */
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(!cpu_intr_p());
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Acquire the global lock to get at the global pool. */
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Wait until there is enough entropy in the system. */
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (E->needed) {
|
|
|
|
/* Ask for more, synchronously if possible. */
|
|
|
|
entropy_request(len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we got enough, we're done. */
|
|
|
|
if (E->needed == 0) {
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(error == 0);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If not waiting, stop here. */
|
|
|
|
if (!ISSET(flags, ENTROPY_WAIT)) {
|
|
|
|
error = EWOULDBLOCK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Wait for some entropy to come in and try again. */
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
2020-09-29 10:51:01 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("entropy: pid %d (%s) blocking due to lack of entropy\n",
|
|
|
|
curproc->p_pid, curproc->p_comm);
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, ENTROPY_SIG)) {
|
|
|
|
error = cv_wait_sig(&E->cv, &E->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cv_wait(&E->cv, &E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
New system call getrandom() compatible with Linux and others.
Three ways to call:
getrandom(p, n, 0) Blocks at boot until full entropy.
Returns up to n bytes at p; guarantees
up to 256 bytes even if interrupted
after blocking. getrandom(0,0,0)
serves as an entropy barrier: return
only after system has full entropy.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_INSECURE) Never blocks. Guarantees up to 256
bytes even if interrupted. Equivalent
to /dev/urandom. Safe only after
successful getrandom(...,0),
getrandom(...,GRND_RANDOM), or read
from /dev/random.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_RANDOM) May block at any time. Returns up to n
bytes at p, but no guarantees about how
many -- may return as short as 1 byte.
Equivalent to /dev/random. Legacy.
Provided only for source compatibility
with Linux.
Can also use flags|GRND_NONBLOCK to fail with EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN
without producing any output instead of blocking.
- The combination GRND_INSECURE|GRND_NONBLOCK is the same as
GRND_INSECURE, since GRND_INSECURE never blocks anyway.
- The combinations GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM and
GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_NONBLOCK are nonsensical and fail
with EINVAL.
As proposed on tech-userlevel, tech-crypto, tech-security, and
tech-kern, and subsequently adopted by core (minus the getentropy part
of the proposal, because other operating systems and participants in
the discussion couldn't come to an agreement about getentropy and
blocking semantics):
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2020/05/02/msg012333.html
2020-08-14 03:53:15 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Count failure -- but fill the buffer nevertheless, unless
|
|
|
|
* the caller specified ENTROPY_HARDFAIL.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, ENTROPY_HARDFAIL))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_extract_fail_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
New system call getrandom() compatible with Linux and others.
Three ways to call:
getrandom(p, n, 0) Blocks at boot until full entropy.
Returns up to n bytes at p; guarantees
up to 256 bytes even if interrupted
after blocking. getrandom(0,0,0)
serves as an entropy barrier: return
only after system has full entropy.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_INSECURE) Never blocks. Guarantees up to 256
bytes even if interrupted. Equivalent
to /dev/urandom. Safe only after
successful getrandom(...,0),
getrandom(...,GRND_RANDOM), or read
from /dev/random.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_RANDOM) May block at any time. Returns up to n
bytes at p, but no guarantees about how
many -- may return as short as 1 byte.
Equivalent to /dev/random. Legacy.
Provided only for source compatibility
with Linux.
Can also use flags|GRND_NONBLOCK to fail with EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN
without producing any output instead of blocking.
- The combination GRND_INSECURE|GRND_NONBLOCK is the same as
GRND_INSECURE, since GRND_INSECURE never blocks anyway.
- The combinations GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM and
GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_NONBLOCK are nonsensical and fail
with EINVAL.
As proposed on tech-userlevel, tech-crypto, tech-security, and
tech-kern, and subsequently adopted by core (minus the getentropy part
of the proposal, because other operating systems and participants in
the discussion couldn't come to an agreement about getentropy and
blocking semantics):
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2020/05/02/msg012333.html
2020-08-14 03:53:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Report a warning if we have never yet reached full entropy.
|
|
|
|
* This is the only case where we consider entropy to be
|
|
|
|
* `depleted' without kern.entropy.depletion enabled -- when we
|
|
|
|
* only have partial entropy, an adversary may be able to
|
|
|
|
* narrow the state of the pool down to a small number of
|
|
|
|
* possibilities; the output then enables them to confirm a
|
|
|
|
* guess, reducing its entropy from the adversary's perspective
|
|
|
|
* to zero.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(E->epoch == (unsigned)-1)) {
|
|
|
|
if (ratecheck(&lasttime, &interval))
|
|
|
|
printf("entropy: WARNING:"
|
|
|
|
" extracting entropy too early\n");
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&E->needed, ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Extract data from the pool, and `deplete' if we're doing that. */
|
|
|
|
entpool_extract(&E->pool, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_depletion)) &&
|
|
|
|
error == 0) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned cost = MIN(len, ENTROPY_CAPACITY)*NBBY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&E->needed,
|
|
|
|
E->needed + MIN(ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - E->needed, cost));
|
|
|
|
entropy_deplete_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
New system call getrandom() compatible with Linux and others.
Three ways to call:
getrandom(p, n, 0) Blocks at boot until full entropy.
Returns up to n bytes at p; guarantees
up to 256 bytes even if interrupted
after blocking. getrandom(0,0,0)
serves as an entropy barrier: return
only after system has full entropy.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_INSECURE) Never blocks. Guarantees up to 256
bytes even if interrupted. Equivalent
to /dev/urandom. Safe only after
successful getrandom(...,0),
getrandom(...,GRND_RANDOM), or read
from /dev/random.
getrandom(p, n, GRND_RANDOM) May block at any time. Returns up to n
bytes at p, but no guarantees about how
many -- may return as short as 1 byte.
Equivalent to /dev/random. Legacy.
Provided only for source compatibility
with Linux.
Can also use flags|GRND_NONBLOCK to fail with EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN
without producing any output instead of blocking.
- The combination GRND_INSECURE|GRND_NONBLOCK is the same as
GRND_INSECURE, since GRND_INSECURE never blocks anyway.
- The combinations GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM and
GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_NONBLOCK are nonsensical and fail
with EINVAL.
As proposed on tech-userlevel, tech-crypto, tech-security, and
tech-kern, and subsequently adopted by core (minus the getentropy part
of the proposal, because other operating systems and participants in
the discussion couldn't come to an agreement about getentropy and
blocking semantics):
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2020/05/02/msg012333.html
2020-08-14 03:53:15 +03:00
|
|
|
out: /* Release the global lock and return the error. */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_poll(events)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return the subset of events ready, and if it is not all of
|
|
|
|
* events, record curlwp as waiting for entropy.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
entropy_poll(int events)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int revents = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Always ready for writing. */
|
|
|
|
revents |= events & (POLLOUT|POLLWRNORM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Narrow it down to reads. */
|
|
|
|
events &= POLLIN|POLLRDNORM;
|
|
|
|
if (events == 0)
|
|
|
|
return revents;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we have reached full entropy and we're not depleting
|
|
|
|
* entropy, we are forever ready.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (__predict_true(atomic_load_relaxed(&E->needed) == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
__predict_true(!atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_depletion)))
|
|
|
|
return revents | events;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, check whether we need entropy under the lock. If
|
|
|
|
* we don't, we're ready; if we do, add ourselves to the queue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (E->needed == 0)
|
|
|
|
revents |= events;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
selrecord(curlwp, &E->selq);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return revents;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* filt_entropy_read_detach(kn)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct filterops::f_detach callback for entropy read events:
|
|
|
|
* remove kn from the list of waiters.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
filt_entropy_read_detach(struct knote *kn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2020-12-11 06:00:09 +03:00
|
|
|
selremove_knote(&E->selq, kn);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* filt_entropy_read_event(kn, hint)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* struct filterops::f_event callback for entropy read events:
|
|
|
|
* poll for entropy. Caller must hold the global entropy lock if
|
|
|
|
* hint is NOTE_SUBMIT, and must not if hint is not NOTE_SUBMIT.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
filt_entropy_read_event(struct knote *kn, long hint)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Acquire the lock, if caller is outside entropy subsystem. */
|
|
|
|
if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we still need entropy, can't read anything; if not, can
|
|
|
|
* read arbitrarily much.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (E->needed != 0) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_depletion))
|
|
|
|
kn->kn_data = ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
kn->kn_data = MIN(INT64_MAX, SSIZE_MAX);
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Release the lock, if caller is outside entropy subsystem. */
|
|
|
|
if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-26 18:10:51 +03:00
|
|
|
/* XXX Makes sense only for /dev/u?random. */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
static const struct filterops entropy_read_filtops = {
|
2021-09-26 18:10:51 +03:00
|
|
|
.f_flags = FILTEROP_ISFD | FILTEROP_MPSAFE,
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
.f_attach = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.f_detach = filt_entropy_read_detach,
|
|
|
|
.f_event = filt_entropy_read_event,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_kqfilter(kn)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Register kn to receive entropy event notifications. May be
|
|
|
|
* EVFILT_READ or EVFILT_WRITE; anything else yields EINVAL.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
entropy_kqfilter(struct knote *kn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (kn->kn_filter) {
|
|
|
|
case EVFILT_READ:
|
|
|
|
/* Enter into the global select queue. */
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
kn->kn_fop = &entropy_read_filtops;
|
2020-12-11 06:00:09 +03:00
|
|
|
selrecord_knote(&E->selq, kn);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
case EVFILT_WRITE:
|
|
|
|
/* Can always dump entropy into the system. */
|
|
|
|
kn->kn_fop = &seltrue_filtops;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rndsource_setcb(rs, get, getarg)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Set the request callback for the entropy source rs, if it can
|
|
|
|
* provide entropy on demand. Must precede rnd_attach_source.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rndsource_setcb(struct krndsource *rs, void (*get)(size_t, void *),
|
|
|
|
void *getarg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rs->get = get;
|
|
|
|
rs->getarg = getarg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_attach_source(rs, name, type, flags)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Attach the entropy source rs. Must be done after
|
|
|
|
* rndsource_setcb, if any, and before any calls to rnd_add_data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_attach_source(struct krndsource *rs, const char *name, uint32_t type,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t extra[4];
|
|
|
|
unsigned i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Grab cycle counter to mix extra into the pool. */
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Apply some standard flags:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - We do not bother with network devices by default, for
|
|
|
|
* hysterical raisins (perhaps: because it is often the case
|
|
|
|
* that an adversary can influence network packet timings).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case RND_TYPE_NET:
|
|
|
|
flags |= RND_FLAG_NO_COLLECT;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity-check the callback if RND_FLAG_HASCB is set. */
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(!ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_HASCB) || rs->get != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the random source. */
|
|
|
|
memset(rs->name, 0, sizeof(rs->name)); /* paranoia */
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(rs->name, name, sizeof(rs->name));
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(&rs->time_delta, 0, sizeof(rs->time_delta));
|
|
|
|
memset(&rs->value_delta, 0, sizeof(rs->value_delta));
|
2020-05-03 09:33:59 +03:00
|
|
|
rs->total = 0;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rs->type = type;
|
|
|
|
rs->flags = flags;
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
rs->state = percpu_alloc(sizeof(struct rndsource_cpu));
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Wire it into the global list of random sources. */
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&E->sources, rs, list);
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Request that it provide entropy ASAP, if we can. */
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_HASCB))
|
|
|
|
(*rs->get)(ENTROPY_CAPACITY, rs->getarg);
|
|
|
|
extra[i++] = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Mix the extra into the pool. */
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(i == __arraycount(extra));
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter(extra, sizeof extra, 0);
|
|
|
|
explicit_memset(extra, 0, sizeof extra);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_detach_source(rs)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Detach the entropy source rs. May sleep waiting for users to
|
|
|
|
* drain. Further use is not allowed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_detach_source(struct krndsource *rs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're cold (shouldn't happen, but hey), just remove it
|
|
|
|
* from the list -- there's nothing allocated.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD) {
|
|
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(rs, list);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We may have to wait for entropy_request. */
|
|
|
|
ASSERT_SLEEPABLE();
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Wait until the source list is not in use, and remove it. */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
while (E->sourcelock)
|
2021-01-14 02:53:23 +03:00
|
|
|
cv_wait(&E->sourcelock_cv, &E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(rs, list);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Free the per-CPU data. */
|
|
|
|
percpu_free(rs->state, sizeof(struct rndsource_cpu));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_lock_sources()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Prevent changes to the list of rndsources while we iterate it.
|
|
|
|
* Interruptible. Caller must hold the global entropy lock. If
|
|
|
|
* successful, no rndsource will go away until rnd_unlock_sources
|
|
|
|
* even while the caller releases the global entropy lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
rnd_lock_sources(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (E->sourcelock) {
|
2021-01-14 02:53:23 +03:00
|
|
|
error = cv_wait_sig(&E->sourcelock_cv, &E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E->sourcelock = curlwp;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_trylock_sources()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Try to lock the list of sources, but if it's already locked,
|
|
|
|
* fail. Caller must hold the global entropy lock. If
|
|
|
|
* successful, no rndsource will go away until rnd_unlock_sources
|
|
|
|
* even while the caller releases the global entropy lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
|
|
rnd_trylock_sources(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD || mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (E->sourcelock)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
2020-05-08 03:54:44 +03:00
|
|
|
E->sourcelock = curlwp;
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_unlock_sources()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Unlock the list of sources after rnd_lock_sources or
|
|
|
|
* rnd_trylock_sources. Caller must hold the global entropy lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rnd_unlock_sources(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD || mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-08 03:54:44 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(E->sourcelock == curlwp, "lwp %p releasing lock held by %p",
|
|
|
|
curlwp, E->sourcelock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
E->sourcelock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
2021-01-14 02:53:23 +03:00
|
|
|
cv_signal(&E->sourcelock_cv);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_sources_locked()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* True if we hold the list of rndsources locked, for diagnostic
|
|
|
|
* assertions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-30 23:06:40 +03:00
|
|
|
static bool __diagused
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_sources_locked(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-08 03:54:44 +03:00
|
|
|
return E->sourcelock == curlwp;
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_request(nbytes)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Request nbytes bytes of entropy from all sources in the system.
|
|
|
|
* OK if we overdo it. Caller must hold the global entropy lock;
|
|
|
|
* will release and re-acquire it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_request(size_t nbytes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
struct krndsource *rs;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD || mutex_owned(&E->lock));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there is a request in progress, let it proceed.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, note that a request is in progress to avoid
|
|
|
|
* reentry and to block rnd_detach_source until we're done.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!rnd_trylock_sources())
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
entropy_request_evcnt.ev_count++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Clamp to the maximum reasonable request. */
|
|
|
|
nbytes = MIN(nbytes, ENTROPY_CAPACITY);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Walk the list of sources. */
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list) {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Skip sources without callbacks. */
|
|
|
|
if (!ISSET(rs->flags, RND_FLAG_HASCB))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-12 23:50:17 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Skip sources that are disabled altogether -- we
|
|
|
|
* would just ignore their samples anyway.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(rs->flags, RND_FLAG_NO_COLLECT))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Drop the lock while we call the callback. */
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
(*rs->get)(nbytes, rs->getarg);
|
|
|
|
if (E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM)
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Notify rnd_detach_source that the request is done. */
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_unlock_sources();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_add_uint32(rs, value)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Enter 32 bits of data from an entropy source into the pool.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If rs is NULL, may not be called from interrupt context.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If rs is non-NULL, may be called from any context. May drop
|
|
|
|
* data if called from interrupt context.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_uint32(struct krndsource *rs, uint32_t value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(rs, &value, sizeof value, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
_rnd_add_uint32(struct krndsource *rs, uint32_t value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(rs, &value, sizeof value, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
_rnd_add_uint64(struct krndsource *rs, uint64_t value)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(rs, &value, sizeof value, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_add_data(rs, buf, len, entropybits)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Enter data from an entropy source into the pool, with a
|
|
|
|
* driver's estimate of how much entropy the physical source of
|
|
|
|
* the data has. If RND_FLAG_NO_ESTIMATE, we ignore the driver's
|
|
|
|
* estimate and treat it as zero.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If rs is NULL, may not be called from interrupt context.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If rs is non-NULL, may be called from any context. May drop
|
|
|
|
* data if called from interrupt context.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(struct krndsource *rs, const void *buf, uint32_t len,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t entropybits)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t extra;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERTMSG(howmany(entropybits, NBBY) <= len,
|
|
|
|
"%s: impossible entropy rate:"
|
|
|
|
" %"PRIu32" bits in %"PRIu32"-byte string",
|
|
|
|
rs ? rs->name : "(anonymous)", entropybits, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If there's no rndsource, just enter the data and time now. */
|
|
|
|
if (rs == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter(buf, len, entropybits);
|
|
|
|
extra = entropy_timer();
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter(&extra, sizeof extra, 0);
|
|
|
|
explicit_memset(&extra, 0, sizeof extra);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load a snapshot of the flags. Ioctl may change them under us. */
|
|
|
|
flags = atomic_load_relaxed(&rs->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Skip if:
|
|
|
|
* - we're not collecting entropy, or
|
|
|
|
* - the operator doesn't want to collect entropy from this, or
|
|
|
|
* - neither data nor timings are being collected from this.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_collection) ||
|
|
|
|
ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_NO_COLLECT) ||
|
|
|
|
!ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE|RND_FLAG_COLLECT_TIME))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If asked, ignore the estimate. */
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_NO_ESTIMATE))
|
|
|
|
entropybits = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we are collecting data, enter them. */
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE))
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_add_data_1(rs, buf, len, entropybits,
|
|
|
|
RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we are collecting timings, enter one. */
|
|
|
|
if (ISSET(flags, RND_FLAG_COLLECT_TIME)) {
|
|
|
|
extra = entropy_timer();
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_add_data_1(rs, &extra, sizeof extra, 0,
|
|
|
|
RND_FLAG_COLLECT_TIME);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
static unsigned
|
|
|
|
add_sat(unsigned a, unsigned b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned c = a + b;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (c < a ? UINT_MAX : c);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
* rnd_add_data_1(rs, buf, len, entropybits, flag)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Internal subroutine to call either entropy_enter_intr, if we're
|
|
|
|
* in interrupt context, or entropy_enter if not, and to count the
|
|
|
|
* entropy in an rndsource.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data_1(struct krndsource *rs, const void *buf, uint32_t len,
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
uint32_t entropybits, uint32_t flag)
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
bool fullyused;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we're in interrupt context, use entropy_enter_intr and
|
|
|
|
* take note of whether it consumed the full sample; if not,
|
|
|
|
* use entropy_enter, which always consumes the full sample.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-05-08 03:54:44 +03:00
|
|
|
if (curlwp && cpu_intr_p()) {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
fullyused = entropy_enter_intr(buf, len, entropybits);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
entropy_enter(buf, len, entropybits);
|
|
|
|
fullyused = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we used the full sample, note how many bits were
|
|
|
|
* contributed from this source.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (fullyused) {
|
2022-03-19 02:34:56 +03:00
|
|
|
if (__predict_false(E->stage == ENTROPY_COLD)) {
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
rs->total = add_sat(rs->total, entropybits);
|
|
|
|
switch (flag) {
|
|
|
|
case RND_FLAG_COLLECT_TIME:
|
|
|
|
rs->time_delta.insamples =
|
|
|
|
add_sat(rs->time_delta.insamples, 1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE:
|
|
|
|
rs->value_delta.insamples =
|
|
|
|
add_sat(rs->value_delta.insamples, 1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
struct rndsource_cpu *rc = percpu_getref(rs->state);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&rc->rc_entropybits,
|
|
|
|
add_sat(rc->rc_entropybits, entropybits));
|
|
|
|
switch (flag) {
|
|
|
|
case RND_FLAG_COLLECT_TIME:
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&rc->rc_timesamples,
|
|
|
|
add_sat(rc->rc_timesamples, 1));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RND_FLAG_COLLECT_VALUE:
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&rc->rc_datasamples,
|
|
|
|
add_sat(rc->rc_datasamples, 1));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
percpu_putref(rs->state);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rnd_add_data_sync(rs, buf, len, entropybits)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Same as rnd_add_data. Originally used in rndsource callbacks,
|
|
|
|
* to break an unnecessary cycle; no longer really needed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data_sync(struct krndsource *rs, const void *buf, uint32_t len,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t entropybits)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(rs, buf, len, entropybits);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rndsource_entropybits(rs)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return approximately the number of bits of entropy that have
|
|
|
|
* been contributed via rs so far. Approximate if other CPUs may
|
|
|
|
* be calling rnd_add_data concurrently.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static unsigned
|
|
|
|
rndsource_entropybits(struct krndsource *rs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned nbits = rs->total;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(rnd_sources_locked());
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
percpu_foreach(rs->state, rndsource_entropybits_cpu, &nbits);
|
|
|
|
return nbits;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rndsource_entropybits_cpu(void *ptr, void *cookie, struct cpu_info *ci)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rndsource_cpu *rc = ptr;
|
|
|
|
unsigned *nbitsp = cookie;
|
|
|
|
unsigned cpu_nbits;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
cpu_nbits = atomic_load_relaxed(&rc->rc_entropybits);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
*nbitsp += MIN(UINT_MAX - *nbitsp, cpu_nbits);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rndsource_to_user(rs, urs)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copy a description of rs out to urs for userland.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user(struct krndsource *rs, rndsource_t *urs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(rnd_sources_locked());
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid kernel memory disclosure. */
|
|
|
|
memset(urs, 0, sizeof(*urs));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CTASSERT(sizeof(urs->name) == sizeof(rs->name));
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(urs->name, rs->name, sizeof(urs->name));
|
|
|
|
urs->total = rndsource_entropybits(rs);
|
|
|
|
urs->type = rs->type;
|
|
|
|
urs->flags = atomic_load_relaxed(&rs->flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rndsource_to_user_est(rs, urse)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copy a description of rs and estimation statistics out to urse
|
|
|
|
* for userland.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user_est(struct krndsource *rs, rndsource_est_t *urse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(rnd_sources_locked());
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid kernel memory disclosure. */
|
|
|
|
memset(urse, 0, sizeof(*urse));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy out the rndsource description. */
|
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user(rs, &urse->rt);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Gather the statistics. */
|
|
|
|
urse->dt_samples = rs->time_delta.insamples;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
urse->dt_total = 0;
|
2021-01-16 05:21:26 +03:00
|
|
|
urse->dv_samples = rs->value_delta.insamples;
|
|
|
|
urse->dv_total = urse->rt.total;
|
|
|
|
percpu_foreach(rs->state, rndsource_to_user_est_cpu, urse);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user_est_cpu(void *ptr, void *cookie, struct cpu_info *ci)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct rndsource_cpu *rc = ptr;
|
|
|
|
rndsource_est_t *urse = cookie;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
urse->dt_samples = add_sat(urse->dt_samples,
|
|
|
|
atomic_load_relaxed(&rc->rc_timesamples));
|
|
|
|
urse->dv_samples = add_sat(urse->dv_samples,
|
|
|
|
atomic_load_relaxed(&rc->rc_datasamples));
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_reset_xc(arg1, arg2)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reset the current CPU's pending entropy to zero.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
entropy_reset_xc(void *arg1 __unused, void *arg2 __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t extra = entropy_timer();
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu_lock lock;
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
struct entropy_cpu *ec;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
* With the per-CPU state locked, zero the pending count and
|
|
|
|
* enter a cycle count for fun.
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
ec = entropy_cpu_get(&lock);
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
ec->ec_pending = 0;
|
|
|
|
entpool_enter(ec->ec_pool, &extra, sizeof extra);
|
2022-03-20 16:17:09 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_cpu_put(&lock, ec);
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* entropy_ioctl(cmd, data)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Handle various /dev/random ioctl queries.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
entropy_ioctl(unsigned long cmd, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct krndsource *rs;
|
|
|
|
bool privileged;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(E->stage >= ENTROPY_WARM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Verify user's authorization to perform the ioctl. */
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETENTCNT:
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETPOOLSTAT:
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETSRCNUM:
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETSRCNAME:
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETESTNUM:
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETESTNAME:
|
2021-09-21 17:54:26 +03:00
|
|
|
error = kauth_authorize_device(kauth_cred_get(),
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
KAUTH_DEVICE_RND_GETPRIV, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RNDCTL:
|
2021-09-21 17:54:26 +03:00
|
|
|
error = kauth_authorize_device(kauth_cred_get(),
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
KAUTH_DEVICE_RND_SETPRIV, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case RNDADDDATA:
|
2021-09-21 17:54:26 +03:00
|
|
|
error = kauth_authorize_device(kauth_cred_get(),
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
KAUTH_DEVICE_RND_ADDDATA, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Ascertain whether the user's inputs should be counted. */
|
2021-09-21 17:54:26 +03:00
|
|
|
if (kauth_authorize_device(kauth_cred_get(),
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
KAUTH_DEVICE_RND_ADDDATA_ESTIMATE,
|
|
|
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0)
|
|
|
|
privileged = true;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default: {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXX Hack to avoid changing module ABI so this can be
|
|
|
|
* pulled up. Later, we can just remove the argument.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static const struct fileops fops = {
|
|
|
|
.fo_ioctl = rnd_system_ioctl,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct file f = {
|
|
|
|
.f_ops = &fops,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
MODULE_HOOK_CALL(rnd_ioctl_50_hook, (&f, cmd, data),
|
|
|
|
enosys(), error);
|
|
|
|
#if defined(_LP64)
|
|
|
|
if (error == ENOSYS)
|
|
|
|
MODULE_HOOK_CALL(rnd_ioctl32_50_hook, (&f, cmd, data),
|
|
|
|
enosys(), error);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (error == ENOSYS)
|
|
|
|
error = ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If anything went wrong with authorization, stop here. */
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Dispatch on the command. */
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETENTCNT: { /* Get current entropy count in bits. */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t *countp = data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
*countp = ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - E->needed;
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETPOOLSTAT: { /* Get entropy pool statistics. */
|
|
|
|
rndpoolstat_t *pstat = data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* parameters */
|
|
|
|
pstat->poolsize = ENTPOOL_SIZE/sizeof(uint32_t); /* words */
|
|
|
|
pstat->threshold = ENTROPY_CAPACITY*1; /* bytes */
|
|
|
|
pstat->maxentropy = ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY; /* bits */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* state */
|
|
|
|
pstat->added = 0; /* XXX total entropy_enter count */
|
|
|
|
pstat->curentropy = ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY - E->needed;
|
|
|
|
pstat->removed = 0; /* XXX total entropy_extract count */
|
|
|
|
pstat->discarded = 0; /* XXX bits of entropy beyond capacity */
|
|
|
|
pstat->generated = 0; /* XXX bits of data...fabricated? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETSRCNUM: { /* Get entropy sources by number. */
|
|
|
|
rndstat_t *stat = data;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t start = 0, i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip if none requested; fail if too many requested. */
|
|
|
|
if (stat->count == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (stat->count > RND_MAXSTATCOUNT)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Under the lock, find the first one, copy out as many
|
|
|
|
* as requested, and report how many we copied out.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
error = rnd_lock_sources();
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (start++ == stat->start)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (i < stat->count && rs != NULL) {
|
2020-04-30 20:16:00 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user(rs, &stat->source[i++]);
|
2020-04-30 20:16:00 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rs = LIST_NEXT(rs, list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(i <= stat->count);
|
|
|
|
stat->count = i;
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_unlock_sources();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETESTNUM: { /* Get sources and estimates by number. */
|
|
|
|
rndstat_est_t *estat = data;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t start = 0, i = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip if none requested; fail if too many requested. */
|
|
|
|
if (estat->count == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if (estat->count > RND_MAXSTATCOUNT)
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Under the lock, find the first one, copy out as many
|
|
|
|
* as requested, and report how many we copied out.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
error = rnd_lock_sources();
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (start++ == estat->start)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (i < estat->count && rs != NULL) {
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user_est(rs, &estat->source[i++]);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rs = LIST_NEXT(rs, list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(i <= estat->count);
|
|
|
|
estat->count = i;
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_unlock_sources();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETSRCNAME: { /* Get entropy sources by name. */
|
|
|
|
rndstat_name_t *nstat = data;
|
|
|
|
const size_t n = sizeof(rs->name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CTASSERT(sizeof(rs->name) == sizeof(nstat->name));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Under the lock, search by name. If found, copy it
|
|
|
|
* out; if not found, fail with ENOENT.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
error = rnd_lock_sources();
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(rs->name, nstat->name, n) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rs != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user(rs, &nstat->source);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
error = ENOENT;
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rnd_unlock_sources();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDGETESTNAME: { /* Get sources and estimates by name. */
|
|
|
|
rndstat_est_name_t *enstat = data;
|
|
|
|
const size_t n = sizeof(rs->name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CTASSERT(sizeof(rs->name) == sizeof(enstat->name));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Under the lock, search by name. If found, copy it
|
|
|
|
* out; if not found, fail with ENOENT.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
error = rnd_lock_sources();
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(rs->name, enstat->name, n) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
if (rs != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rndsource_to_user_est(rs, &enstat->source);
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
error = ENOENT;
|
2020-04-30 19:50:00 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rnd_unlock_sources();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDCTL: { /* Modify entropy source flags. */
|
|
|
|
rndctl_t *rndctl = data;
|
|
|
|
const size_t n = sizeof(rs->name);
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
uint32_t resetflags = RND_FLAG_NO_ESTIMATE|RND_FLAG_NO_COLLECT;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
uint32_t flags;
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
bool reset = false, request = false;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CTASSERT(sizeof(rs->name) == sizeof(rndctl->name));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Whitelist the flags that user can change. */
|
|
|
|
rndctl->mask &= RND_FLAG_NO_ESTIMATE|RND_FLAG_NO_COLLECT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* For each matching rndsource, either by type if
|
|
|
|
* specified or by name if not, set the masked flags.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(rs, &E->sources, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (rndctl->type != 0xff) {
|
|
|
|
if (rs->type != rndctl->type)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(rs->name, rndctl->name, n) != 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
flags = rs->flags & ~rndctl->mask;
|
|
|
|
flags |= rndctl->flags & rndctl->mask;
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
if ((rs->flags & resetflags) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
(flags & resetflags) != 0)
|
|
|
|
reset = true;
|
|
|
|
if ((rs->flags ^ flags) & resetflags)
|
|
|
|
request = true;
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&rs->flags, flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
2020-05-10 05:56:12 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we disabled estimation or collection, nix all the
|
|
|
|
* pending entropy and set needed to the maximum.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (reset) {
|
|
|
|
xc_broadcast(0, &entropy_reset_xc, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
E->pending = 0;
|
|
|
|
atomic_store_relaxed(&E->needed,
|
|
|
|
ENTROPY_CAPACITY*NBBY);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we changed any of the estimation or collection
|
|
|
|
* flags, request new samples from everyone -- either
|
|
|
|
* to make up for what we just lost, or to get new
|
|
|
|
* samples from what we just added.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (request) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
entropy_request(ENTROPY_CAPACITY);
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case RNDADDDATA: { /* Enter seed into entropy pool. */
|
|
|
|
rnddata_t *rdata = data;
|
|
|
|
unsigned entropybits = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!atomic_load_relaxed(&entropy_collection))
|
|
|
|
break; /* thanks but no thanks */
|
|
|
|
if (rdata->len > MIN(sizeof(rdata->data), UINT32_MAX/NBBY))
|
|
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This ioctl serves as the userland alternative a
|
|
|
|
* bootloader-provided seed -- typically furnished by
|
|
|
|
* /etc/rc.d/random_seed. We accept the user's entropy
|
|
|
|
* claim only if
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (a) the user is privileged, and
|
|
|
|
* (b) we have not entered a bootloader seed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* under the assumption that the user may use this to
|
|
|
|
* load a seed from disk that we have already loaded
|
|
|
|
* from the bootloader, so we don't double-count it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-05-06 21:31:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (privileged && rdata->entropy && rdata->len) {
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
mutex_enter(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!E->seeded) {
|
|
|
|
entropybits = MIN(rdata->entropy,
|
|
|
|
MIN(rdata->len, ENTROPY_CAPACITY)*NBBY);
|
|
|
|
E->seeded = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_exit(&E->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Enter the data and consolidate entropy. */
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
rnd_add_data(&seed_rndsource, rdata->data, rdata->len,
|
|
|
|
entropybits);
|
2020-05-07 22:05:51 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_consolidate();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
error = ENOTTY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return any error that may have come up. */
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Legacy entry points */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_seed(void *seed, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len != sizeof(rndsave_t)) {
|
|
|
|
printf("entropy: invalid seed length: %zu,"
|
|
|
|
" expected sizeof(rndsave_t) = %zu\n",
|
|
|
|
len, sizeof(rndsave_t));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entropy_seed(seed);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entropy_init();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
rnd_init_softint(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entropy_init_late();
|
2022-03-19 02:35:07 +03:00
|
|
|
entropy_bootrequest();
|
Rewrite entropy subsystem.
Primary goals:
1. Use cryptography primitives designed and vetted by cryptographers.
2. Be honest about entropy estimation.
3. Propagate full entropy as soon as possible.
4. Simplify the APIs.
5. Reduce overhead of rnd_add_data and cprng_strong.
6. Reduce side channels of HWRNG data and human input sources.
7. Improve visibility of operation with sysctl and event counters.
Caveat: rngtest is no longer used generically for RND_TYPE_RNG
rndsources. Hardware RNG devices should have hardware-specific
health tests. For example, checking for two repeated 256-bit outputs
works to detect AMD's 2019 RDRAND bug. Not all hardware RNGs are
necessarily designed to produce exactly uniform output.
ENTROPY POOL
- A Keccak sponge, with test vectors, replaces the old LFSR/SHA-1
kludge as the cryptographic primitive.
- `Entropy depletion' is available for testing purposes with a sysctl
knob kern.entropy.depletion; otherwise it is disabled, and once the
system reaches full entropy it is assumed to stay there as far as
modern cryptography is concerned.
- No `entropy estimation' based on sample values. Such `entropy
estimation' is a contradiction in terms, dishonest to users, and a
potential source of side channels. It is the responsibility of the
driver author to study the entropy of the process that generates
the samples.
- Per-CPU gathering pools avoid contention on a global queue.
- Entropy is occasionally consolidated into global pool -- as soon as
it's ready, if we've never reached full entropy, and with a rate
limit afterward. Operators can force consolidation now by running
sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1.
- rndsink(9) API has been replaced by an epoch counter which changes
whenever entropy is consolidated into the global pool.
. Usage: Cache entropy_epoch() when you seed. If entropy_epoch()
has changed when you're about to use whatever you seeded, reseed.
. Epoch is never zero, so initialize cache to 0 if you want to reseed
on first use.
. Epoch is -1 iff we have never reached full entropy -- in other
words, the old rnd_initial_entropy is (entropy_epoch() != -1) --
but it is better if you check for changes rather than for -1, so
that if the system estimated its own entropy incorrectly, entropy
consolidation has the opportunity to prevent future compromise.
- Sysctls and event counters provide operator visibility into what's
happening:
. kern.entropy.needed - bits of entropy short of full entropy
. kern.entropy.pending - bits known to be pending in per-CPU pools,
can be consolidated with sysctl -w kern.entropy.consolidate=1
. kern.entropy.epoch - number of times consolidation has happened,
never 0, and -1 iff we have never reached full entropy
CPRNG_STRONG
- A cprng_strong instance is now a collection of per-CPU NIST
Hash_DRBGs. There are only two in the system: user_cprng for
/dev/urandom and sysctl kern.?random, and kern_cprng for kernel
users which may need to operate in interrupt context up to IPL_VM.
(Calling cprng_strong in interrupt context does not strike me as a
particularly good idea, so I added an event counter to see whether
anything actually does.)
- Event counters provide operator visibility into when reseeding
happens.
INTEL RDRAND/RDSEED, VIA C3 RNG (CPU_RNG)
- Unwired for now; will be rewired in a subsequent commit.
2020-04-30 06:28:18 +03:00
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}
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int
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rnd_system_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned long cmd, void *data)
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{
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return entropy_ioctl(cmd, data);
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}
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