NetBSD/bin/rm/rm.c

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/* $NetBSD: rm.c,v 1.42 2004/01/11 09:41:55 wiz Exp $ */
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994, 2003
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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#ifndef lint
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__COPYRIGHT("@(#) Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994\n\
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n");
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#endif /* not lint */
#ifndef lint
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#if 0
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static char sccsid[] = "@(#)rm.c 8.8 (Berkeley) 4/27/95";
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#else
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__RCSID("$NetBSD: rm.c,v 1.42 2004/01/11 09:41:55 wiz Exp $");
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#endif
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#endif /* not lint */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <fts.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <pwd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int dflag, eval, fflag, iflag, Pflag, stdin_ok, vflag, Wflag;
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int check(char *, char *, struct stat *);
void checkdot(char **);
void rm_file(char **);
void rm_overwrite(char *, struct stat *);
void rm_tree(char **);
void usage(void);
int main(int, char *[]);
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/*
* For the sake of the `-f' flag, check whether an error number indicates the
* failure of an operation due to an non-existent file, either per se (ENOENT)
* or because its filename argument was illegal (ENAMETOOLONG, ENOTDIR).
*/
#define NONEXISTENT(x) \
((x) == ENOENT || (x) == ENAMETOOLONG || (x) == ENOTDIR)
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/*
* rm --
* This rm is different from historic rm's, but is expected to match
* POSIX 1003.2 behavior. The most visible difference is that -f
* has two specific effects now, ignore non-existent files and force
* file removal.
*/
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
int ch, rflag;
setprogname(argv[0]);
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(void)setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
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Pflag = rflag = 0;
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while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfiPRrvW")) != -1)
switch (ch) {
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case 'd':
dflag = 1;
break;
case 'f':
fflag = 1;
iflag = 0;
break;
case 'i':
fflag = 0;
iflag = 1;
break;
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case 'P':
Pflag = 1;
break;
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case 'R':
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case 'r': /* Compatibility. */
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rflag = 1;
break;
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case 'v':
vflag = 1;
break;
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case 'W':
Wflag = 1;
break;
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case '?':
default:
usage();
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc < 1)
usage();
checkdot(argv);
if (*argv) {
stdin_ok = isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
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if (rflag)
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rm_tree(argv);
else
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rm_file(argv);
}
exit(eval);
/* NOTREACHED */
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}
void
rm_tree(char **argv)
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{
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FTS *fts;
FTSENT *p;
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int flags, needstat, rval;
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/*
* Remove a file hierarchy. If forcing removal (-f), or interactive
* (-i) or can't ask anyway (stdin_ok), don't stat the file.
*/
needstat = !fflag && !iflag && stdin_ok;
/*
* If the -i option is specified, the user can skip on the pre-order
* visit. The fts_number field flags skipped directories.
*/
#define SKIPPED 1
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flags = FTS_PHYSICAL;
if (!needstat)
flags |= FTS_NOSTAT;
if (Wflag)
flags |= FTS_WHITEOUT;
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if (!(fts = fts_open(argv, flags,
(int (*)(const FTSENT **, const FTSENT **))NULL)))
err(1, NULL);
while ((p = fts_read(fts)) != NULL) {
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switch (p->fts_info) {
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case FTS_DNR:
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if (!fflag || p->fts_errno != ENOENT) {
warnx("%s: %s", p->fts_path,
strerror(p->fts_errno));
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eval = 1;
}
continue;
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case FTS_ERR:
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "%s: %s", p->fts_path,
strerror(p->fts_errno));
/* NOTREACHED */
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case FTS_NS:
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/*
* FTS_NS: assume that if can't stat the file, it
* can't be unlinked.
*/
if (fflag && NONEXISTENT(p->fts_errno))
continue;
if (needstat) {
warnx("%s: %s", p->fts_path,
strerror(p->fts_errno));
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eval = 1;
continue;
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}
break;
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case FTS_D:
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/* Pre-order: give user chance to skip. */
if (!fflag && !check(p->fts_path, p->fts_accpath,
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p->fts_statp)) {
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(void)fts_set(fts, p, FTS_SKIP);
p->fts_number = SKIPPED;
}
continue;
case FTS_DP:
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/* Post-order: see if user skipped. */
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if (p->fts_number == SKIPPED)
continue;
break;
default:
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if (!fflag &&
!check(p->fts_path, p->fts_accpath, p->fts_statp))
continue;
}
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rval = 0;
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/*
* If we can't read or search the directory, may still be
* able to remove it. Don't print out the un{read,search}able
* message unless the remove fails.
*/
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switch (p->fts_info) {
case FTS_DP:
case FTS_DNR:
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rval = rmdir(p->fts_accpath);
if (rval != 0 && fflag && errno == ENOENT)
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continue;
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break;
case FTS_W:
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rval = undelete(p->fts_accpath);
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if (rval != 0 && fflag && errno == ENOENT)
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continue;
break;
default:
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if (Pflag)
rm_overwrite(p->fts_accpath, NULL);
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rval = unlink(p->fts_accpath);
if (rval != 0 && fflag && NONEXISTENT(errno))
continue;
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break;
}
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if (rval != 0) {
warn("%s", p->fts_path);
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eval = 1;
} else if (vflag)
(void)printf("%s\n", p->fts_path);
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}
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if (errno)
err(1, "fts_read");
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}
void
rm_file(char **argv)
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{
struct stat sb;
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int rval;
char *f;
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/*
* Remove a file. POSIX 1003.2 states that, by default, attempting
* to remove a directory is an error, so must always stat the file.
*/
while ((f = *argv++) != NULL) {
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/* Assume if can't stat the file, can't unlink it. */
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if (lstat(f, &sb)) {
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if (Wflag) {
sb.st_mode = S_IFWHT|S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR;
} else {
if (!fflag || !NONEXISTENT(errno)) {
warn("%s", f);
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eval = 1;
}
continue;
}
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} else if (Wflag) {
warnx("%s: %s", f, strerror(EEXIST));
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eval = 1;
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continue;
}
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if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) && !dflag) {
warnx("%s: is a directory", f);
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eval = 1;
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continue;
}
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if (!fflag && !S_ISWHT(sb.st_mode) && !check(f, f, &sb))
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continue;
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if (S_ISWHT(sb.st_mode))
rval = undelete(f);
else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
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rval = rmdir(f);
else {
if (Pflag)
rm_overwrite(f, &sb);
rval = unlink(f);
}
if (rval && (!fflag || !NONEXISTENT(errno))) {
warn("%s", f);
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eval = 1;
}
if (vflag && rval == 0)
(void)printf("%s\n", f);
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}
}
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/*
* rm_overwrite --
* Overwrite the file 3 times with varying bit patterns.
*
* This is an expensive way to keep people from recovering files from your
* non-snapshotted FFS filesystems using fsdb(8). Really. No more. Only
* regular files are deleted, directories (and therefore names) will remain.
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* Also, this assumes a fixed-block file system (like FFS, or a V7 or a
* System V file system). In a logging file system, you'll have to have
* kernel support.
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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*
* A note on standards: U.S. DoD 5220.22-M "National Industrial Security
* Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") is often cited as a reference
* for clearing and sanitizing magnetic media. In fact, a matrix of
* "clearing" and "sanitization" methods for various media was given in
* Chapter 8 of the original 1995 version of NISPOM. However, that
* matrix was *removed from the document* when Chapter 8 was rewritten
* in Change 2 to the document in 2001. Recently, the Defense Security
* Service has made a revised clearing and sanitization matrix available
* in Microsoft Word format on the DSS web site. The standardization
* status of this matrix is unclear. Furthermore, one must be very
* careful when referring to this matrix: it is intended for the "clearing"
* prior to reuse or "sanitization" prior to disposal of *entire media*,
* not individual files and the only non-physically-destructive method of
* "sanitization" that is permitted for magnetic disks of any kind is
* specifically noted to be prohibited for media that have contained
* Top Secret data.
*
* It is impossible to actually conform to the exact procedure given in
* the matrix if one is overwriting a file, not an entire disk, because
* the procedure requires examination and comparison of the disk's defect
* lists. Any program that claims to securely erase *files* while
* conforming to the standard, then, is not correct. We do everything
*
* Furthermore, the presence of track caches, disk and controller write
* caches, and so forth make it extremely difficult to ensure that data
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* have actually been written to the disk, particularly when one tries
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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* to repeatedly overwrite the same sectors in quick succession. We call
* fsync(), but controllers with nonvolatile cache, as well as IDE disks
* that just plain lie about the stable storage of data, will defeat this.
*
* Finally, widely respected research suggests that the given procedure
* is nowhere near sufficient to prevent the recovery of data using special
* forensic equipment and techniques that are well-known. This is
* presumably one reason that the matrix requires physical media destruction,
* rather than any technique of the sort attempted here, for secret data.
*
* Caveat Emptor.
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*/
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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void
rm_overwrite(char *file, struct stat *sbp)
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{
struct stat sb;
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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int fd, randint;
char randchar;
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fd = -1;
if (sbp == NULL) {
if (lstat(file, &sb))
goto err;
sbp = &sb;
}
if (!S_ISREG(sbp->st_mode))
return;
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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/* flags to try to defeat hidden caching by forcing seeks */
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDWR|O_SYNC|O_RSYNC, 0)) == -1)
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goto err;
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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#define RAND_BYTES 1
#define THIS_BYTE 0
#define WRITE_PASS(mode, byte) do { \
off_t len; \
int wlen, i; \
char buf[8 * 1024]; \
\
if (fsync(fd) || lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET)) \
goto err; \
\
if (mode == THIS_BYTE) \
memset(buf, byte, sizeof(buf)); \
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for (len = sbp->st_size; len > 0; len -= wlen) { \
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
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if (mode == RAND_BYTES) { \
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); \
i+= sizeof(u_int32_t)) \
*(int *)(buf + i) = arc4random(); \
} \
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wlen = len < sizeof(buf) ? len : sizeof(buf); \
if (write(fd, buf, wlen) != wlen) \
goto err; \
} \
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
2004-01-11 05:04:05 +03:00
sync(); /* another poke at hidden caches */ \
} while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0)
Change behaviour of -P option to conform generally to DoD 5220.22-M standard. This change inspired by Apple's "Secure Empty Trash" functionality in MacOS 10.3. However, it is important to understand that this change does not -- and can not -- actually achieve conformance to the current revision of the standard. To quote the manual page: The -P option attempts to conform to U.S. DoD 5220-22.M, "National Indus- trial Security Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") as updated by Change 2 and the July 23, 2003 "Clearing & Sanitization Matrix". However, unlike earlier revisions of NISPOM, the 2003 matrix imposes requirements which make it clear that the standard does not and can not apply to the erasure of individual files, in particular requirements relating to spare sector management for an entire magnetic disk. Because these requirements are not met, the -P option does not conform to the standard. This also makes the -P option a *lot* more expensive than it used to be. It used to overwrite with 0xff, overwrite with 0x00, overwrite with 0xff, with an fsync after each write. Now it overwrites with a random character, overwrites with 0xff, overwrites with 0x00, reads to validate the 0x00 overwrite, then overwrites with random data -- calling sync() after every operation in an attempt to force seeks that will clear the data from the cache of disks that lie about whether data has been committed to the platters. Also, the file's opened with O_SYNC|O_RSYNC to cause metadata updates on every read/write, which should cause still more seeks. This is better than it used to be, but it's by no means adequate if you have data you really don't want read by an adversary who can pull the disk apart.
2004-01-11 05:04:05 +03:00
#define READ_PASS(byte) do { \
off_t len; \
int rlen; \
char pattern[8 * 1024]; \
char buf[8 * 1024]; \
\
if (fsync(fd) || lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET)) \
goto err; \
\
memset(pattern, byte, sizeof(pattern)); \
for(len = sbp->st_size; len > 0; len -= rlen) { \
rlen = len < sizeof(buf) ? len : sizeof(buf); \
if(read(fd, buf, rlen) != rlen) \
goto err; \
if(memcmp(buf, pattern, rlen)) \
goto err; \
} \
sync(); /* another poke at hidden caches */ \
} while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0)
/*
* DSS sanitization matrix "clear" for magnetic disks:
* option 'c' "Overwrite all addressable locations with a single
* character."
*/
randint = arc4random();
randchar = *(char *)&randint;
WRITE_PASS(THIS_BYTE, randchar);
/*
* DSS sanitization matrix "sanitize" for magnetic disks:
* option 'd', sub 2 "Overwrite all addressable locations with a
* character, then its complement. Verify "complement" character
* was written successfully to all addressable locations, then
* overwrite all addressable locations with random characters; or
* verify third overwrite of random characters." The rest of the
* text in d-sub-2 specifies requirements for overwriting spared
* sectors; we cannot conform to it when erasing only a file, thus
* we do not conform to the standard.
*/
/* 1. "a character" */
WRITE_PASS(THIS_BYTE, 0xff);
/* 2. "its complement" */
WRITE_PASS(THIS_BYTE, 0x00);
/* 3. "Verify 'complement' character" */
READ_PASS(0x00);
/* 4. "overwrite all addressable locations with random characters" */
WRITE_PASS(RAND_BYTES, 0x00);
/*
* As the file might be huge, and we note that this revision of
* the matrix says "random characters", not "a random character"
* as the original did, we do not verify the random-character
* write; the "or" in the standard allows this.
*/
if (!close(fd))
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return;
err: eval = 1;
warn("%s", file);
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}
int
check(char *path, char *name, struct stat *sp)
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{
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int ch, first;
char modep[15];
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/* Check -i first. */
if (iflag)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "remove '%s'? ", path);
else {
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/*
* If it's not a symbolic link and it's unwritable and we're
* talking to a terminal, ask. Symbolic links are excluded
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* because their permissions are meaningless. Check stdin_ok
* first because we may not have stat'ed the file.
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*/
if (!stdin_ok || S_ISLNK(sp->st_mode) ||
!(access(name, W_OK) && (errno != ETXTBSY)))
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return (1);
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strmode(sp->st_mode, modep);
(void)fprintf(stderr, "override %s%s%s/%s for '%s'? ",
modep + 1, modep[9] == ' ' ? "" : " ",
user_from_uid(sp->st_uid, 0),
group_from_gid(sp->st_gid, 0), path);
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}
(void)fflush(stderr);
first = ch = getchar();
while (ch != '\n' && ch != EOF)
ch = getchar();
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return (first == 'y' || first == 'Y');
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}
/*
* POSIX.2 requires that if "." or ".." are specified as the basename
* portion of an operand, a diagnostic message be written to standard
* error and nothing more be done with such operands.
*
* Since POSIX.2 defines basename as the final portion of a path after
* trailing slashes have been removed, we'll remove them here.
*/
1997-07-21 00:51:08 +04:00
#define ISDOT(a) ((a)[0] == '.' && (!(a)[1] || ((a)[1] == '.' && !(a)[2])))
void
checkdot(char **argv)
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{
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char *p, **save, **t;
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int complained;
complained = 0;
for (t = argv; *t;) {
/* strip trailing slashes */
p = strrchr(*t, '\0');
while (--p > *t && *p == '/')
*p = '\0';
/* extract basename */
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if ((p = strrchr(*t, '/')) != NULL)
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++p;
else
p = *t;
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if (ISDOT(p)) {
if (!complained++)
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warnx("\".\" and \"..\" may not be removed");
eval = 1;
for (save = t; (t[0] = t[1]) != NULL; ++t)
continue;
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t = save;
} else
++t;
}
}
void
usage(void)
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{
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(void)fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-f|-i] [-dPRrvW] file ...\n",
getprogname());
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exit(1);
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/* NOTREACHED */
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}