2012-02-02 23:42:57 +04:00
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/* $NetBSD: cdvar.h,v 1.31 2012/02/02 19:43:06 tls Exp $ */
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 1997 Manuel Bouyer. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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1999-02-02 16:02:49 +03:00
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#define CDRETRIES 4
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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struct cd_softc {
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2008-03-24 21:27:06 +03:00
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device_t sc_dev;
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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struct disk sc_dk;
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2007-07-21 23:51:47 +04:00
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kmutex_t sc_lock;
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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int flags;
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#define CDF_WLABEL 0x04 /* label is writable */
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#define CDF_LABELLING 0x08 /* writing label */
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#define CDF_ANCIENT 0x10 /* disk is ancient; for minphys */
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2001-04-25 21:53:04 +04:00
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struct scsipi_periph *sc_periph;
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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struct cd_parms {
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2005-02-01 03:19:34 +03:00
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u_int blksize;
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u_long disksize; /* total number sectors */
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u_long disksize512; /* total number sectors */
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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} params;
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2001-04-25 21:53:04 +04:00
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2005-10-15 21:29:10 +04:00
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struct bufq_state *buf_queue;
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Improve handling of memory shortage, to fix problems like:
sd3(mpt0:0:1:0): unable to allocate scsipi_xfer
sd3: not queued, error 12
Havard Eidnes's analysis of this problem is that the scsipi_xfer pool is
competing for resources with other pools, including the the inode and vnode
pools which can grow quite large.
*_scsipi_cmd(): don't biodone the buffer if scsipi_make_xs() fails, let the
caller deal with the problem
start function of block devices drivers: dequeue the buffer after the
scsipi_command() call. If scsipi_command() fails with ENOMEM don't dequeue
the buffer, and schedule a callout to call the start function after
some delay.
scsipi_init(): prime the scsipi_xfer_pool with one page. This ensure that
there is always some scsipi_xfer to play with. If scsipi_command() fails
because of pool_get(), we're sure there will be resources available later,
when the pending commands have completed.
Reviewed by Jason Thorpe and Havard Eidnes.
Todo: remove the "unable to allocate scsipi_xfer" and "not queued, error %d"
printfs, but I choose to keep them for now, to help make sure the code does
what it should.
2004-08-28 00:37:28 +04:00
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struct callout sc_callout;
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1997-10-10 05:09:03 +04:00
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First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
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krndsource_t rnd_source;
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1997-08-27 15:22:52 +04:00
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};
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