First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
# $NetBSD: files.opencrypto,v 1.25 2011/11/19 22:51:30 tls Exp $
|
2003-07-26 01:12:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-27 01:31:44 +03:00
|
|
|
# Opencrypto framework.
|
2003-12-31 19:44:26 +03:00
|
|
|
# Devices that provide crypto transforms via opencrypto, or subsystems
|
|
|
|
# that use the opencrypto framework, should list opencrypto as a dependency
|
|
|
|
# to pull in the framework.
|
2003-08-24 23:21:11 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-25 19:16:46 +03:00
|
|
|
define opencrypto
|
|
|
|
file opencrypto/criov.c opencrypto
|
2003-07-26 01:12:39 +04:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/xform.c opencrypto
|
2003-12-31 19:44:26 +03:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/crypto.c opencrypto
|
2003-07-27 07:34:39 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-25 19:16:46 +03:00
|
|
|
# Pseudo-device that provides software implementations of various cryptographic
|
|
|
|
# algorithms.
|
2005-11-25 19:41:31 +03:00
|
|
|
defpseudo swcrypto: opencrypto,
|
First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes
the following:
An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are
fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
boot time.
A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
as soon as it is available.
The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.
An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This
is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.
A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is
based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter
mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.
An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current
cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from
the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
current cryptographic practice.
In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve.
The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
not an optional kernel component.
The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is
approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
continues to run.
A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl.
The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
are not, yet.
Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-20 02:51:18 +04:00
|
|
|
blowfish, des, cast128, skipjack, camellia
|
2005-11-25 19:41:31 +03:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/cryptosoft.c swcrypto
|
|
|
|
file opencrypto/deflate.c swcrypto # wrapper around zlib
|
2011-05-24 23:10:08 +04:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/aesxcbcmac.c swcrypto
|
2011-05-27 01:50:02 +04:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/gmac.c swcrypto
|
2003-12-31 19:44:26 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Pseudo-device for userspace access to opencrypto
|
|
|
|
# (and thus crypto hardware accelerators).
|
2005-11-25 19:16:46 +03:00
|
|
|
defpseudo crypto: opencrypto
|
2003-12-31 19:44:26 +03:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/cryptodev.c crypto
|
2011-02-19 19:26:34 +03:00
|
|
|
file opencrypto/ocryptodev.c crypto & compat_50
|
2008-02-04 03:35:34 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
defflag opt_ocf.h CRYPTO_DEBUG CRYPTO_TIMING
|