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import the real 9.3.2 not 9.2.3.
2005-12-22 02:06:48 +03:00
Network Working Group B. Laurie
Internet-Draft Nominet
Expires: March 2, 2005 R. Loomis
SAIC
September 2004
Requirements related to DNSSEC Signed Proof of Non-Existence
draft-ietf-dnsext-signed-nonexistence-requirements-01
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
DNSSEC-bis uses the NSEC record to provide authenticated denial of
existence of RRsets. NSEC also has the side-effect of permitting
zone enumeration, even if zone transfers have been forbidden.
Because some see this as a problem, this document has been assembled
to detail the possible requirements for denial of existence A/K/A
signed proof of non-existence.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Non-purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Zone Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Zone Enumeration II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Zone Enumeration III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Exposure of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Zone Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Single Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. Empty Non-terminals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10. Prevention of Precomputed Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . 6
11. DNSSEC-Adoption and Zone-Growth Relationship . . . . . . . . 6
12. Non-overlap of denial records with possible zone records . . 7
13. Exposure of Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
14. Minimisation of Zone Signing Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
15. Minimisation of Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
16. Minimisation of Client Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
17. Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
18. Purity of Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
19. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
20. Compatibility with NSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
21. Compatibility with NSEC II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
22. Compatibility with NSEC III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
23. Coexistence with NSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
24. Coexistence with NSEC II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
25. Protocol Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
26. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
27. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
28. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
29. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
30. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
30.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
30.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
NSEC records allow trivial enumeration of zones - a situation that
has existed for several years but which has recently been raised as a
significant concern for DNSSECbis deployment in several zones.
Alternate proposals have been made that make zone enumeration more
difficult, and some previous proposals to modify DNSSEC had related
requirements/desirements that are relevant to the discussion. In
addition the original designs for NSEC/NXT records were based on
working group discussions and the choices made were not always
documented with context and requirements-- so some of those choices
may need to be restated as requirements. Overall, the working group
needs to better understand the requirements for denial of existence
(and certain other requirements related to DNSSECbis deployment) in
order to evaluate the proposals that may replace NSEC.
In the remainder of this document, "NSEC++" is used as shorthand for
"a denial of existence proof that will replace NSEC". "NSECbis" has
also been used as shorthand for this, but we avoid that usage since
NSECbis will not be part of DNSSECbis and therefore there might be
some confusion.
2. Non-purposes
This document does not currently document the reasons why zone
enumeration might be "bad" from a privacy, security, business, or
other perspective--except insofar as those reasons result in
requirements. Once the list of requirements is complete and vaguely
coherent, the trade-offs (reducing zone enumeration will have X cost,
while providing Y benefit) may be revisited. The editors of this
compendium received inputs on the potential reasons why zone
enumeration is bad (and there was significant discussion on the
DNSEXT WG mailing list) but that information fell outside the scope
of this document.
Note also that this document does not assume that NSEC *must* be
replaced with NSEC++, if the requirements can be met through other
methods (e.g., "white lies" with the current NSEC). As is stated
above, this document is focused on requirements collection and
(ideally) prioritization rather than on the actual implementation.
3. Zone Enumeration
Authenticated denial should not permit trivial zone enumeration.
Additional discussion: NSEC (and NXT before it) provide a linked
list that could be "walked" to trivially enumerate all the signed
records in a zone. This requirement is primarily (though not
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exclusively) important for zones that either are delegation-only/
-mostly or do not have reverse lookup (PTR) records configured, since
enterprises that have PTR records for all A records have already
provided a similar capability to enumerate the contents of DNS zones.
Contributor: various
4. Zone Enumeration II
Zone enumeration should be at least as difficult as it would be to
effect a dictionary attack using simple DNS queries to do the same in
an unsecured zone.
(Editor comment: it is not clear how to measure difficulty in this
case. Some examples could be monetary cost, bandwidth, processing
power or some combination of these. It has also been suggested that
the requirement is that the graph of difficulty of enumeration vs.
the fraction of the zone enumerated should be approximately the same
shape in the two cases)
Contributor: Nominet
5. Zone Enumeration III
Enumeration of a zone with random contents should computationally
infeasible.
Editor comment: this is proposed as a way of evaluating the
effectiveness of a proposal rather than as a requirement anyone would
actually have in practice.
Contributor: Alex Bligh
6. Exposure of Contents
NSEC++ should not expose any of the contents of the zone (apart from
the NSEC++ records themselves, of course).
Editor comment: this is a weaker requirement than prevention of
enumeration, but certainly any zone that satisfied this requirement
would also satisfy the trivial prevention of enumeration requirement.
Contributor: Ed Lewis
7. Zone Size
Requirement: NSEC++ should make it possible to take precautions
against trivial zone size estimates. Since not all zone owners care
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about others estimation of the size of a zone, it is not always
necessary to prohibit trivial estimation of the size of the zone but
NSEC++ should allow such measures.
Additional Discussion: Even with proposals based on obfuscating names
with hashes it is trivial to give very good estimates of the number
of domains in a certain zone. Just send 10 random queries and look
at the range between the two hash values returned in each NSEC++. As
hash output can be assumed to follow a rectangular random
distribution, using the mean difference between the two values, you
can estimate the total number of records. It is probably sufficient
to look at even one NSEC++, since the two hash values should follow a
(I believe) Poisson distribution.
The concern is motivated by some wording remembered from NSEC, which
stated that NSEC MUST only be present for existing owner names in the
zone, and MUST NOT be present for non-existing owner names. If
similar wording were carried over to NSEC++, introducing bogus owner
names in the hash chain (an otherwise simple solution to guard
against trivial estimates of zone size) wouldn't be allowed.
One simple attempt at solving this is to describe in the
specifications how zone signer tools can add a number of random
"junk" records.
Editor's comment: it is interesting that obfuscating names might
actually make it easier to estimate zone size.
Contributor: Simon Josefsson.
8. Single Method
Requirement: A single NSEC++ method must be able to carry both
old-style denial (i.e. plain labels) and whatever the new style
looks like. Having two separate denial methods could result in
cornercases where one method can deny the other and vice versa.
Additional discussion: This requirement can help -bis folks to a
smooth upgrade to -ter. First they'd change the method while the
content is the same, then they can change content of the method.
Contributor: Roy Arends.
9. Empty Non-terminals
Requirement: Empty-non-terminals (ENT) should remain empty. In
other words, adding NSEC++ records to an existing DNS structure
should not cause the creation of NSEC++ records (or related records)
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at points that are otherwise ENT.
Additional discussion: Currently NSEC complies with ENT requirement:
b.example.com NSEC a.c.example.com implies the existence of an ENT
with ownername c.example.com. NSEC2 breaks that requirement, since
the ownername is entirely hashed causing the structure to disappear.
This is why EXIST was introduced. But EXIST causes ENT to be
non-empty-terminals. Next to the dissappearance of ENT, it causes
(some) overhead since an EXIST record needs a SIG, NSEC2 and
SIG(NSEC2). DNSNR honours this requirement by hashing individual
labels instead of ownernames. However this causes very long labels.
Truncation is a measure against very long ownernames, but that is
controversial. There is a fair discussion of the validity of
truncation in the DNSNR draft, but that hasn't got proper review yet.
Contributor: Roy Arends.
(Editor comment: it is not clear to us that an EXIST record needs an
NSEC2 record, since it is a special purpose record only used for
denial of existence)
10. Prevention of Precomputed Dictionary Attacks
Requirement: NSEC++ needs to provide a method to reduce the
effectiveness of precomputed dictionary attacks.
Additional Discussion: Salt is a measure against dictionary attacks.
There are other possible measures (such as iterating hashes in
NSEC2). The salt needs to be communicated in every response, since
it is needed in every verification. Some have suggested to move the
salt to a special record instead of the denial record. I think this
is not wise. Response size has more priority over zone size. An
extra record causes a larger response than a larger existing record.
Contributor: Roy Arends.
(Editor comment: the current version of NSEC2 also has the salt in
every NSEC2 record)
11. DNSSEC-Adoption and Zone-Growth Relationship
Background: Currently with NSEC, when a delegation centric zone
deploys DNSSEC, the zone-size multiplies by a non-trivial factor even
when the DNSSEC-adoption rate of the subzones remains low--because
each delegation point creates at least one NSEC record and
corresponding signature in the parent even if the child is not
signed.
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Requirements: A delegation-only (or delegation-mostly) zone that is
signed but which has no signed child zones should initially need only
to add SIG(SOA), DNSKEY, and SIG(DNSKEY) at the apex, along with some
minimal set of NSEC++ records to cover zone contents. Further,
during the transition of a delegation-only zone from 0% signed
children to 100% signed children, the growth in the delegation-only
zone should be roughly proportional to the percentage of signed child
zones.
Additional Discussion: This is why DNSNR has the Authoritative Only
bit. This is similar to opt-in for delegations only. This (bit) is
currently the only method to help delegation-centric zone cope with
zone-growth due to DNSSEC adoption. As an example, A delegation only
zone which deploys DNSSEC with the help of this bit, needs to add
SIG(SOA), DNSKEY, SIG(DNSKEY), DNSNR, SIG(DNSNR) at the apex. No
more than that.
Contributor: Roy Arends.
12. Non-overlap of denial records with possible zone records
Requirement: NSEC++ records should in some way be differentiated
from regular zone records, so that there is no possibility that a
record in the zone could be duplicated by a non-existence proof
(NSEC++) record.
Additional discussion: This requirement is derived from a discussion
on the DNSEXT mailing list related to copyrights and domain names.
As was outlined there, one solution is to put NSEC++ records in a
separate namespace, e.g.: $ORIGIN co.uk.
873bcdba87401b485022b8dcd4190e3e IN NS jim.rfc1035.com ; your
delegation 873bcdba87401b485022b8dcd4190e3e._no IN NSEC++ 881345...
; for amazon.co.uk.
Contributor: various
(Editor comment: One of us still does not see why a conflict
matters. Even if there is an apparent conflict or overlap, the
"conflicting" NSEC2 name _only_ appears in NSEC2 records, and the
other name _never_ appears in NSEC2 records.)
13. Exposure of Private Keys
Private keys associated with the public keys in the DNS should be
exposed as little as possible. It is highly undesirable for private
keys to be distributed to nameservers, or to otherwise be available
in the run-time environment of nameservers.
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Contributors: Nominet, Olaf Kolkman, Ed Lewis
14. Minimisation of Zone Signing Cost
The additional cost of creating an NSEC++ signed zone should not
significantly exceed the cost of creating an ordinary signed zone.
Contributor: Nominet
15. Minimisation of Asymmetry
Nameservers should have to do as little additional work as necessary.
More precisely, it is desirable for any increase in cost incurred by
the nameservers to be offset by a proportionate increase in cost to
DNS `clients', e.g. stub and/or `full-service' resolvers.
Contributor: Nominet
16. Minimisation of Client Complexity
Caching, wildcards, CNAMEs, DNAMEs should continue to work without
adding too much complexity at the client side.
Contributor: Olaf Kolkman
17. Completeness
A proof of nonexistence should be possible for all nonexistent data
in the zone.
Contributor: Olaf Kolkman
18. Purity of Namespace
The name space should not be muddied with fake names or data sets.
Contributor: Ed Lewis
19. Replay Attacks
NSEC++ should not allow a replay to be used to deny existence of an
RR that actually exists.
Contributor: Ed Lewis
20. Compatibility with NSEC
NSEC++ should not introduce changes incompatible with NSEC.
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Contributor: Ed Lewis
21. Compatibility with NSEC II
NSEC++ should differ from NSEC in a way that is transparent to the
resolver or validator.
Contributor: Ed Lewis
22. Compatibility with NSEC III
NSEC++ should differ from NSEC as little as possible whilst achieving
other requirements.
Contributor: Alex Bligh
23. Coexistence with NSEC
NSEC++ should be optional, allowing NSEC to be used instead.
Contributor: Ed Lewis, Alex Bligh
24. Coexistence with NSEC II
NSEC++ should not impose extra work on those content with NSEC.
Contributor: Ed Lewis
25. Protocol Design
A good security protocol would allow signing the nonexistence of some
selected names without revealing anything about other names.
Contributor: Dan Bernstein
26. Process
Clearly not all of these requirements can be met. Therefore the next
phase of this document will be to either prioritise them or narrow
them down to a non-contradictory set, which should then allow us to
judge proposals on the basis of their fit.
27. Acknowledgements
28. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
29. Security Considerations
There are currently no security considerations called out in this
draft. There will be security considerations in the choice of which
requirements will be implemented, but there are no specific security
requirements during the requirements collection process.
30. References
30.1 Normative References
[dnssecbis-protocol]
"DNSSECbis Protocol Definitions", BCP XX, RFC XXXX, Some
Month 2004.
30.2 Informative References
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2418] Bradner, S., "IETF Working Group Guidelines and
Procedures", BCP 25, RFC 2418, September 1998.
Authors' Addresses
Ben Laurie
Nominet
17 Perryn Road
London W3 7LR
England
Phone: +44 (20) 8735 0686
EMail: ben@algroup.co.uk
Rip Loomis
Science Applications International Corporation
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046
US
EMail: gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com
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